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What has happened when a city goes bankrupt? Is the "mu-
nicipal corporation" dissolved? What stands in its place? Do the
creditors take over City Hall and the city's streets and alleys? Can
the creditors obtain a lien on the city's primary source of income:
taxes? Can the bankruptcy court override the decisions of elected
officials regarding taxation and spending? How high must taxes go,
how low must services get, and who decides? Who are the residual
stakeholders? Can we pierce the municipal "corporate veil?" If we
do, who is behind it? What is the role of the state?
As these questions suggest, the bankruptcy of a municipal cor-
poration raises fundamental issues regarding the nature of the city,
and a study of municipal bankruptcy promises to shed considera-
ble light on the scholarly debate over its legal status. Yet the sub-
ject of municipal bankruptcy has received little attention in the
legal literature.1 The subject is apparently of too little practical fi-
nancial importance to attract the attention of bankruptcy scholars
(there are, after all, few municipal bankruptcies), but of such
daunting technical complexity that it has discouraged serious in-
vestigation by local government specialists.2 It is our intention to
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Valente and David J. McCarthy, Jr., Local Government Law: Cases and Materials (West,
4th ed 1992). The exception is Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law: Legal and
Related Materials 656-85 (Foundation, 2d rev ed 1986).
The University of Chicago Law Review
bridge these two fields of legal scholarship by exploring the mean-
ing of bankruptcy in the context of municipal corporations and
what this has to say about the legal structure of cities and their
relation to their citizens, their states, their creditors, and the
courts.
The perennial problem of bankruptcy is twofold. At the front
end, cities and other borrowers need to be able to make credible,
legally-enforceable promises to repay-or no one would be willing
to lend to them. This requires a legal regime strong enough to
overcome the "moral hazard" problem-the tendency of debtors to
prefer to devote their resources to their own interests instead of
repaying their debts. At the back end, it is not always possible to
pay, and it is in the interest of all (creditors as well as debtors) to
reach an accommodation when this eventuality occurs. This may
require coercion of unwilling parties, since individual creditors may
find it in their interest to resist a solution even when it is in the
interest of the creditors as a whole. This is the "collective action"
problem. The rub is that bankruptcy-the solution to the collec-
tive action problem-ineluctably weakens the legal backing for
promises to pay, and thus exacerbates the moral hazard problem.
In part, this Article analyzes the ways in which the legal status
of municipal corporations affects these aspects of bankruptcy law.
In Section I, we address the legal remedies available to municipal
creditors as they existed before there was a municipal bankruptcy
law. These remedies reveal both the fundamental preconceptions
of the system and the purposes of the federal bankruptcy law. In
Section II, we analyze the federal bankruptcy law itself, with par-
ticular attention to the ways in which it seeks to reduce the moral
hazard problem. This Section concludes that municipal bank-
ruptcy law does not well serve its intended purposes. One "solu-
tion" to the moral hazard problem is to erect barriers to municipal
bankruptcy filings, which we have surely done, and to carry over
into bankruptcy the key rights that creditors would have relied on
outside of bankruptcy, as we may have done. Whether this is the
best response to the moral hazard problem is a question to which
we return below, but its effect on municipal bankruptcy has been
direct-cities seldom file.
Moreover, bankruptcy law accomplishes more than merely to
adjust the debts of entities unable to pay. In the private context,
bankruptcy law also serves as a mechanism for reorganization so as
to maximize value and minimize the recurrence of financial diffi-
culties. It is the rare corporation that emerges from bankruptcy
unchanged, its operations intact and going on as before. Federal
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municipal bankruptcy law, by contrast, is designed to perform the
debt adjustment function without serving the reorganization func-
tion. Indeed, the premise of municipal bankruptcy law is that the
city will emerge from bankruptcy in the same form-with the same
boundaries, resources, functions, and governing structure-with
which it entered bankruptcy. In Section III, we question this pre-
mise and speculate about whether bankruptcy could function in
the municipal context as it does in the private context: as an in-
strument for more efficient organization.
Throughout the Article, we explore the ramifications of two
different ways of conceptualizing a city: as a political subdivision
of the sovereign state, and as the agent of the private citizens who
inhabit it. These conceptions of the city influence both the range
of creditors' rights and the features of the federal bankruptcy law.
But they are of particular importance to the final Section. The for-
mer view of the city, as an arm of the state, suggests that munici-
pal bankruptcy should be treated as an occasion for consolidating
the distressed municipality into larger units of government, or for
larger units (probably the state) to bear some responsibility for the
debts of the city. The latter view, that the city is the agent of its
private citizens, suggests that bankruptcy should allow the dissolu-
tion of the municipal corporation into its constituent parts, fol-
lowed by voluntary reorganization into more efficient and effective
units. Under either view, we suggest that bankruptcy law could
serve more ambitious purposes than mere debt adjustment if we
ceased to hold the present configuration of cities as sacrosanct.
I. MuNicIPAL DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND ADJUSTMENT BEFORE
PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL ACT
Prior to 1933, there was neither state nor federal municipal
bankruptcy legislation. Indeed, it appeared, for a time, that the
Constitution prevented either level of government from touching
the subject. For the federal government to do so would intrude
into the internal governance of states and their political subdivi-
sions and thus violate state sovereignty;s for the state government
to do so would impair the obligation of contracts (something the
federal government may do but states may not).4 Congress did not
' Ashton v Cameron County District, 298 US 513, 531 (1936).
' See Hanover Nat'l Bank v Moyses, 186 US 181, 188 (1902) ("[Congress's power under
the Bankruptcy Clause] includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and
legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the
power to impair the obligations of contracts, and this the States were forbidden to do.");
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venture to pass a municipal bankruptcy law until the Great De-
pression, and the Supreme Court's first reaction was to strike it
down.' By 1942, however, the Supreme Court would saw off both
horns of this doctrinal dilemma. In 1938, in United States v Be-
kins,6 the Court upheld Congress's second attempt to pass a mu-
nicipal bankruptcy statute, and in 1942, in Faitoute Iron & Steel
Co. v Asbury Park,7 it upheld the states' authority to compel un-
willing creditors to join in a plan of adjustment of municipal debts.
But until that time-and when Congress was drafting the original
municipal bankruptcy statute-the very possibility of municipal
debt relief raised grave constitutional doubts. Thus, the fundamen-
tal premises of current law were shaped by pre-1938 constitutional
considerations: the Contracts Clause explains why we have a fed-
eral bankruptcy statute for municipalities (instead of leaving the
matter to state law), while the principle of state autonomy explains
its narrow scope (in contrast to private bankruptcy law).
The 1937 Act was originally adopted as a temporary emer-
gency measure, and was to expire in 1940. It was extended several
times8 and was made permanent in 1946.9 Congress revised the Act
substantially in 1976,10 made additional changes as part of the en-
actment of the 1978 Code, and further tinkered with the statute in
198411 and 1988.12 We will discuss the provisions of current law in
detail in Section II. We begin, however, with a discussion of the
law of municipal default before 1933, for two reasons. First, the
bankruptcy regime has meaning only as compared to the state of
affairs'that exists outside of bankruptcy. Second, many of the most
interesting features of modern municipal bankruptcy have their or-
igins not in the federal acts, but in the law that preceded them. To
a surprising degree, the shape of modern litigation over municipal
insolvency was set by the (in some ways artificial) legal categories
of the mid- to late nineteenth century.
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Rela-
tionship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 Cal L Rev 267
(1988) (discussing reasons why the Contracts Clause applies only to the states).
I Ashton, 298 US 513.
6 304 US 27 (1938).
7 316 US 502 (1942).
8 See, for example, Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat 667, 670 c 438 (1940) (extending the
Act until 1942).
60 Stat 409, codified at 11 USC §§ 401 et seq (1946).
10 Pub L 94-260, 90 Stat 315, codified at 11 USC §§ 401 et seq (1976).
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, PL 98-353, 98 Stat
333, 383-84, codified at 11 USC §§ 490-98 (1984).
12 Municipal Bankruptcy Amendments, Pub L 100-597, 102 Stat 3028 (1988).
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In the absence of federal statutory law, the question of munic-
ipal default was governed by state statute and state and federal
common law.13 During this period, the law of municipal bank-
ruptcy was the law of creditors' remedies. Cities could not declare
bankruptcy, but they could-and frequently did-fail to pay their
debts. Thus, the legal question was: what could the courts do to
compel cities to meet their financial obligations? Among the reme-
dies creditors of a municipality might seek were: (1) seizure of city
property; (2) judicial oversight of city financial affairs, including
limitations on expenditures that would divert funds away from
debt service; (3) seizure of private property within the city; (4)
state assumption of municipal indebtedness; (5) obtaining a lien on
future tax revenues; and (6) imposition of new taxes earmarked for
debt service.
Each of these theoretical remedies, except the last, has an ana-
logue in private bankruptcy. Seizure of assets is the quintessential
creditor's remedy-the right to levy on assets is the ultimate back-
ing of private debt. Judicial supervision of financial affairs closely
tracks the current role of the Bankruptcy Court under the Code. A
central feature of these remedial regimes is the court's power to
ensure that the debtor does not make unnecessary or unreasonable
expenditures that reduce its ability to pay its debts. Seizing pri-
vate property is analogous to piercing the corporate veil; this forces
the real owners of the corporation to assume its obligations. Re-
quiring the state to assume municipal obligations is analogous to
requiring a parent corporation to assume the debts of its subsidi-
ary. A lien on future taxes is similar to garnishing wages or ob-
taining a lien on future income. Only the remedy of new taxes
lacks a close private analogue. A private creditor may be able to
garnish the wages of a debtor or obtain a lien on the debtor's fu-
ture income stream, but he cannot force the debtor to go out and
make more money. Interestingly, although municipal creditors at-
tempted each of these avenues for relief, only the last avenue was
usually available in actual practice.
A. Seizure of City Property
The most basic remedy available to creditors in the private
sphere is seizure of the debtor's property. If this remedy were
" These were the days before Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), which
was decided in the same year that the second municipal bankruptcy act was upheld by the
Supreme Court.
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available to municipal creditors, they could seize the assets of the
city (city hall, schools, police equipment, fire trucks, streets and
alleys, and so forth) in satisfaction of the debt. This remedy under-
stands the city to be a mere corporation, established by its citizens
for particular purposes, more akin to a business corporation than
to a sovereign government.
Strange as it may seem, it was not unusual to view municipal
corporations as quasi-private organizations serving the interests of
their members rather than as inherently political entities. In a
classic mid-nineteenth century case, the Ohio Supreme Court ex-
plained the denial of sovereign immunity for a city's torts on the
ground that "municipal corporations proper" are "created mainly
for the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality and its
people" rather than being part of the "sovereign and paramount
authority" of the State.14 More pointedly, in Kaufman v City of
Tallahassee, 5 the Supreme Court of Florida commented that "a
city's functions have become more and more ministerial, in that its
duties consist largely, if not entirely, in the management of public
utilities such as waterworks and sewerage systems, electric lighting
and power plants, gas plants, telephones, and street railways,...
for the financial advantage and profit of the city.' 6 According to
the court it took "very little stretching of this doctrine" to say that
"no municipal function is governmental, a city is not a political
subdivision of the state, not a government but purely a business,
commercial, proprietary management of local public interests."' 7
This was an extreme statement of a common view of cities during
that era-one which lends credence to the claim of creditors to
municipal property in the event of default. Why not, if cities are
essentially business enterprises? 8
Notwithstanding inflated rhetoric about the similarity of cities
to businesses, no court permitted such a drastic remedy. Some
courts flatly held that no property of a municipal corporation may
be seized by the creditors.' 9 The predominant rule, however, was
that only property held in a proprietary capacity was subject to
14 Comm'rs of Hamilton Co. v Mighels, 7 Ohio St 109, 119 (1857). See also City of
Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 191-92 (1923), and cases cited therein.
1" 84 Fla 634, 94 S 697 (1922).
10 Id at 699.
17 Id.
"8 For a modern expression of this view, see Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeown-
ers Associations, 130 U Pa L Rev 1519 (1982) (comparing cities to homeowners'
associations).
"' See, for example, City of Chicago v Hasley, 25 IMl 595 (1861).
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debt foreclosure. "Public property" dedicated to a "public
use"-such as "streets, wharves, cemeteries, hospitals, court-
houses, and other public buildings" 2-was exempt, as were funds
held in the municipal treasury for general use.21 The doctrinal ex-
planation was that this property was held in "trust for the public"
and "to no other use can [it] be appropriated without special legis-
lative sanction."22 This doctrine was based on the legal fiction that
municipal property was owned by the public but the debts were
owed by the corporation. As the Louisiana Supreme Court ex-
plained in a leading case:
an execution can not be levied on any property held by a mu-
nicipality or other public corporation for public purposes,...
the principle being that title to such property is held in trust
for the public and hence can no more be sold to settle the
debts of a city or other political subdivision than can any
other trust property be sold to settle the individual debts of
any other trustee.23
This was a strange way of looking at the matter, for it treated
the city government as identical to the public for purposes of prop-
erty ownership but as a private interest for purposes of payment of
municipal debts. Perhaps the point was that the city held the
property in trust not for its citizens but for the general public. In
this view, the issue was not whether trustees were taking from the
beneficial owner of the trust, but whether one public (citizens of
the city) was taking from another public (the people of the state or
nation). This is consistent with the "public trust" doctrine, which
holds (among other things) that municipalities may not favor resi-
dents over nonresidents with respect to the use of certain lands
held in trust for the people.24 But the doctrine applies only to
property open to the general public, such as streets, parks, and wa-
terfront. More convincing with reference to most property was the
straightforward concern of other courts that a seizure of municipal
property could prevent the city from performing its essential gov-
20 Meriwether v Garrett, 102 US 472, 513 (1880).
21 Droz v Parish of East Baton Rouge, 36 La Ann 340 (1884).
22 Meriwether, 102 US at 513.
23 Town of Farmerville v Commercial Credit Co., 173 La 43, 136 S 82, 85 (1931), quot-
ing 17 RCL § 43 at 145 (emphasis in original).
24 See, for example, Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ 306, 471 A2d
355, 358 (1984). On similar logic, it was thought that city officials had no authority to sell
common lands.
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ernmental functions-an unthinkable result.25 "However strong
the obligation of a town or city to pay its debts," an Illinois appel-
late court stated, "to allow payment to be enforced by execution
would so far impair the usefulness and power of the corporation, in
the discharge of its government functions, that the public good re-
quired the denial of such a right. '26
In theory, this principle did not apply to all municipal prop-
erty; there was a class of property "which is not and can never be
needed for strictly municipal or public purposes," and was there-
fore available to creditors.2 7 The Supreme Court described as "pro-
prietary" property "held in [the municipality's] own right for
profit or as a source of revenue, not charged with any public trust
or use."2 8 This might include, for example, an unused vacant lot
outside the corporate limits29 or a private residence taken for fail-
ure to pay taxes.30 Some courts suggested it might extend to prop-
erty used to provide services that could just as well be provided by
private firms, such as water or gas31 (though when push came to
shove this was usually rejected 32).
The dichotomy between the governmental and proprietary
functions of municipalities was closely related to a wider legal con-
ception of cities, which in their governmental capacities were seen
(in the mid- to late nineteenth century) as wholly subordinate to
the state, but in their proprietary capacity as independent of state
power and control.33 For example, courts sometimes held that the
28 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v City of Chicago, 170 MI1 580, 48 NE 967, 968 (1897),
overruled by Henderson v Foster, 59 Ill 2d 343, 319 NE2d 789 (1974). See also Hasley, 25 IMl
at 596.
2 Brazil v City of Chicago, 315 IlM App 436, 43 NE2d 212, 214 (1942). This remains the
general rule today. For example, in a much-noted decision, a lower state court allovied a
judgment creditor to seize the City Hall of East St. Louis, but the decision was overturned
on appeal. See Estate of DeBow v City of East St. Louis, 228 M1 App 3d 437, 592 NE2d 1139
(1992), appeal granted, 146 Ill 2d 626, 602 NE2d 450 (1992).
27 Farmerville, 136 S at 85.
28 Meriwether, 102 US at 518.
29 Murphree v City of Mobile, 108 Ala 663, 18 S 740, 741 (1895). For a recent example,
see Estate of DeBow, 592 NE2d at 1144-45 (upholding seizure of a 220-acre tract of vacant
land, a former industrial site, on the ground that the record was devoid of any evidence that
the tract "serves any cognizable municipal function").
30 City of Sherman v Williams, 84 Tex 421, 19 SW 606, 606-07 (1892).
22 Flutmus v City of Newport, 175 Ky 817, 194 SW 1039 (1917) (waterworks). See also
Darling & Morse v Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 51 Md 1, 12-13 (1878) (discussing
and ultimately rejecting the distinction).
2 See Bullis v Town of Jackson, 4 S2d 550, 552 (La App 1941); 76 ALR 695, 695-700
(1932).
33 See John Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, ch 1, § 9 at 82-83
& n 1 (J. Cockcroft, 1st ed 1872) (explaining and criticizing the distinction).
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state could expropriate municipal property without compensation
if the property was governmental, but was obliged to pay compen-
sation under the Fifth Amendment or corresponding provisions of
state constitutional law for the taking of municipal property held
in a proprietary capacity.3 4 Municipal corporations were chimerical
institutions-half sovereign (hence subdivisions of the state), half
corporation (hence creations of their incorporators, with property
rights against the state).3 5 Insofar as cities were corporations, cred-
itors could seize their assets in satisfaction for debts; but insofar as
they were governments, the property belonged to the people of the
state and could not be diverted to private purposes-even to the
purposes of paying the lawful debts of the muncipal corporation
incurred on behalf of the people.
In actual practice, very little property fell into the "proprie-
tary" category. Even when courts recognized creditors' rights to ex-
ecute against the quasi-private property of the municipality in the-
ory, they strained to vitiate the protection. Rental payments by an
entertainment company for use of a public opera hall were said to
be on account of a public use because the space might be needed
for public offices in the future. 6 One court even called the leasing
of vacant realty a public use because the property was being held
for more advantageous future sale.37 The scope of "public use"
was, in reality, as broad as the legitimate activities of the city. Ac-
cording to the leading commentator of the era, "[t]he instances in
which anything is collected by levy upon a municipality's property,
or upon some alleged proprietary fund, are few."38
This meant that the principal backstop of private creditors'
rights-the right to seize the assets of the debtor-was unavailable
to the municipal creditor. Understanding the merits-or demer-
34 James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 275 (Halsted, 3d ed 1836). See Town
of Milwaukee v City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis 93, 109 (1860); Grogan v San Francisco, 18 Cal
590, 612-13 (1861); Mount Hope Cemetery v Boston, 158 Mass 509, 33 NE 695, 698 (1893);
Spaulding v Andover, 54 NH 38, 56 (1873); Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 179-80
(1907) (dictum). The Supreme Court repudiated this argument as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law in City of Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 191-92 (1923).
3 See Gerald E. Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1057, 1099-1109
(1980). For a typical statement of the position in a judicial opinion, see City of Hazard v
Duff, 287 Ky 427, 154 SW2d 28, 29 (1941).
36 Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v White, 224 Ky 570, 6 SW2d 699, 701-02
(1928).
17 United Taxpayers Co. v City and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal 264, 259 P 1101,
1102 (1927).
A.M. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds: A Century of Experience 277 (Prentice-Hall,
1936). But see Duff, 154 SW2d 28 (allowing execution against a building owned by munici-
pal waterworks).
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its-of this is complex. One of the most damning criticisms of
debtor-creditor law in the private sector is that individual creditors
will seize property of the failing debtor without regard to the col-
lective interest of the creditors. 9 Value that might well be availa-
ble to the creditors as a group will be dissipated as individual cred-
itors descend on the failing debtor and pick over its assets. A
particular creditor has no reason to consider how its actions affect
others. There may be ways to eliminate this problem through the
careful grant of security interests,40 but the municipal seizure rule
addresses the problem directly and largely eliminates it, possibly
making it a better rule.41
The critical question is whether anything is lost by denying
creditors the right to seize assets. Seizure of assets attracts atten-
tion to the debtor and may precipitate a bankruptcy filing, either
by the debtor or by the creditors. Such a filing may be in the inter-
est of the creditor group, since bankruptcy is the collective pro-
ceeding for debt collection and since bankruptcy results in-at
least in the private context-more oversight over the debtor's af-
fairs. A bankruptcy filing may limit the extent to which the debtor
can dissipate assets. The issue then is a trade-off: seizure itself may
dissipate value but may reduce the extent to which the debtor oth-
erwise dissipates value. It is quite possible that an intermediate
procedure might be best. If creditors were barred from seizing as-
sets but were able to achieve priority over those assets through
public filings, we would avoid the direct seizure loss but might still
retain enough of the public character of seizure to ensure that at-
tention is drawn to the debtor's situation.42
B. Judicial Oversight of City Financial Affairs
For nonmunicipal debtors, filing for bankruptcy results in a
substantial relinquishment of control over their day-to-day affairs.
The loss is almost total when a trustee is appointed, but even when
the debtor acts as debtor-in-possession, the loss of control is palpa-
ble. Decisions out of the ordinary course of business require court
" See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10
(Harvard, 1986).
40 See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U Chi
L Rev 645 (1992).
41 We also note that there may be losses from moving assets from public to private
hands; this is a general concern which we develop more extensively later in the Article.
42 A few states have moved in the direction of allowing priority through filing without
seizure as to the property of private debtors. See William J. Woodward, Jr., New Judgment
Liens on Personal Property: Does "Efficient" Mean "Better'?, 27 Harv J Leg 1, 4 (1990).
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hearings with all parties in interest having an opportunity to be
heard.43 Expenditures of the debtor are closely scrutinized to en-
sure that any available surplus will be devoted to creditors' claims.
By contrast, the courts had no authority to limit the discretion
of city officials to control the operating budget of the municipality.
In East St. Louis v Zebley, the Supreme Court held that "the
question, what expenditures are proper and necessary for the mu-
nicipal administration, is not judicial; it is confided by law to the
discretion of the municipal authorities. No court has the right to
control that discretion." 44 The theory seems to be that the level of
expenditures is an inherently political issue, not susceptible to sci-
entific and disinterested evaluation. It would violate structural
principles of federalism and separation of powers for federal courts
to interfere with local democratic decisionmaking about levels of
spending. In effect, this gave current city expenditures absolute
priority over payment of past obligations.
This feature of the common law is now codified in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The resulting freedom of the municipal debtor to
spend at will on objects of its own choosing, notwithstanding the
effect on the creditors, is one of the most significant differences
between private and municipal bankruptcy. Priorities in bank-
ruptcy are not unusual-§ 507 contains a lengthy list of priorities
and § 1114 creates a complex priority for retiree benefits. None-
theless, "the public good" has no natural definition,4 and we
would expect an expansive interpretation of it by city officials
faced with a choice between paying bondholders and providing
benefits to constituents. The particular quality of this priority
places municipal creditors in a position unlike that of any private
creditor. It removes one of the principal disincentives to fiscal irre-
sponsibility, exacerbating the moral hazard problem of
bankruptcy.
This judicial reticence to invade local political authority ex-
tended even to more ministerial functions, such as the collection of
" See 11 USC § 363(b) (1988).
44 110 US 321, 324 (1884). For a striking example, in which a creditor was unable to
obtain enforcement of a $300 debt owed by the city, see Bullis, 4 S2d at 553:
It may be that some of the items budgeted by the defendant town as expenditures
appear to be a bit high, but there is certainly no proof to show that they are inflated or
were arbitrarily fixed with the ideas of padding the budget to escape the payment of
any legitimate debts due by it. Besides, the framing of their budgets seems to be a
matter which is left to the discretion of the town councils, and courts are without au-
thority to regulate them in preparing or supplementing the same.
4 See text accompanying notes 160-68.
"' See City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S Ct 1344, 1352 (1991).
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taxes already imposed. In some notorious cases, city officials delib-
erately frustrated enforcement of taxes levied to secure payment of
municipal debts, in some instances resigning so that there was no
one to carry out the legal duty of tax collection. In the absence of
express statutory authorization by the state, courts held that they
could not appoint a receiver to perform these functions.47
A few states, however, imposed oversight boards or receiver-
ships in cases of municipal default. The first such system was insti-
tuted by Missouri in the mid-1870s. This system gave creditors the
option of accepting compromise bonds, which, if unpaid, would be
redeemed through appointment of an official to assess and collect
taxes sufficient to pay all judgments.48 Similarly, Texas legislation
required the governor to appoint a tax collector in the event that
the elected collector should resign or refuse to collect the taxes re-
quired for repayment of interest and principal.4 The State of Ten-
nessee imposed the first formal municipal receivership on Mem-
phis, in the notorious municipal default that led to the famous.
Supreme Court case of Meriwether v Garrett." The state legisla-
ture literally disincorporated Memphis in 1879, transferring its ter-
ritory and municipal functions to an entity called the "Taxing Dis-
trict of Shelby County," and the governor appointed
commissioners to put the financial affairs of the city into order.5 1
Other cities placed in receivership under state law included Mo-
bile, Alabama; Manchester, New Hampshire; and Fall River, Mas-
sachusetts. During the Depression, a wave of piecemeal state legis-
lation permitted or required receiverships in the event of
municipal defaults-though only New Jersey and Massachusetts
had comprehensive legislation of this type.52 As discussed in more
detail below, 8 receiverships under state law continue to play a ma-
jor role in resolving municipal financial crises.
For the most part, state receivership laws were special legisla-
tion enacted, like the first federal municipal bankruptcy statute,
during the Great Depression. In the pre-Act period, receiverships
were rarely available, and never at common law. Federal courts
thus lacked authority to oversee municipal finances.
'" See, for example, Walkley v City of Muscatine, 73 US 481 (1867).
48 Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 323-24 (cited in note 38).
49 Id at 324.
50 102 US 472 (1880).
5 Id at 477-95.
52 The New Jersey scheme is described in Hourigan v North Bergen Township, 113
NJL 143, 172 A 193, 194-97 (1934).
53 See text accompanying notes 203-11.
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C. Seizure of Private Property Within the City
Some creditors sought tQ levy execution on the property of
private persons within the defaulting jurisdiction. The theory was
that the city is a creation of its citizens for their mutual benefit,
and that the citizens are therefore the residual stakeholders, both
as to assets and as to obligations. The relation of the citizen to the
city was thus analogized to that of the shareholder to the corpora-
tion without limited liability; in effect, when you pierce the munic-
ipal corporate veil, you find the citizens of the municipality. An-
other analogue might be the partnership, where general partners
are personally liable for the debts of the partnership.
The notion that a private person's property could be seized to
pay the debt of the city now seems unthinkable, but it was (and
still is, in theory at least) the rule in most of the New England
states. Interestingly, the courts in these states did not appeal to
the private corporation analogy, but instead treated the municipal
corporation as "by immemorial usage an exception" from the gen-
eral rule that "an individual member of an aggregate corporation is
not liable for any debts or demands against it.""' The Connecticut
Supreme Court reasoned that municipal or quasi-corporations are
"not, strictly speaking, corporations, but only municipal bodies,
without pecuniary funds," and thus are not entitled to the protec-
tion of limited liability.5 5 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts observed that "[t]owns, parishes, precincts, &c., are but a
collection of individuals with certain corporate powers for political
and civil purposes, without any corporate fund from which a judg-
ment can be satisfied, but each member of the community is liable
in his person or estate to the execution which may issue against
the body."5 6 A similar approach was adopted by statute in New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. 57
Outside of New England, the enforcement of municipal debts
against private citizens was uniformly rejected.58 Summarizing
" Chase v Merrimack Bank, 36 Mass 564, 568 (1837). The absence of a "corporate
fund" created the ground of distinction.
Beardsley v Smith, 16 Conn 368, 376 (1844).
58 Merchants Bank v Cook, 21 Mass 405, 414 (1826); Chase, 36 Mass at 569.
Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 277 (cited in note 38). See also John F. Dillon, 4
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 1506 at 2673-74 n 4 (Little, Brown,
5th ed 1911).
59 A partial exception was the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which passed special acts
in the 1870s that induced creditors to accept compromise bonds and gave them the right to
levy upon the private property of inhabitants if these new obligations were not satisfied.
Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 324 (cited in note 38). Generally, the New England rule was
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state law, the United States Supreme Court held that "the private
property of the inhabitants of a municipal body cannot be sub-
jected to the payment of its debts, except by way of taxation.""e
Justice Strong invoked the analogy to the limited liability corpora-
tion: "the private property of individuals within the territorial lim-
its of a municipal corporation cannot be reached by its creditors
directly, any more than the private property of stockholders in
other corporation can thus be reached. '60 Taking this analogy fur-
ther, one could argue that the relation between citizen and the city
is not akin to that of ownership. The only claim of the city (or its
creditors) on the property of the citizen is that to which the citizen
has consented through the democratic process-which means taxa-
tion with representation.
Rejection of the New England rule might also be explained on
* the basis of more mundane considerations of practicality. These
considerations were detailed by the California Supreme Court in
an opinion by Stephen Field, later Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court:
There appear to us insurmountable difficulties in the way of
any just application of the [New England] rule. The inhabi-
tants of a county are constantly changing; those who contrib-
uted to the debt may be non-residents upon the recovery of
the judgment, or the levy of the execution; those who opposed
the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment,
whilst those by whose fault the burden has been imposed may
be entirely relieved of responsibility. Again it is a settled prin-
ciple that whenever one of several is held liable for their joint
debt, he may have recourse, upon its payment, to the others
for contribution. To enforce this right against the inhabitants
of a county, even where its population is small, would lead to
such a multiplicity of suits as to render the right utterly
valueless.6 1
The conflict between the New England rule and the rule that
prevailed elsewhere in the country replicates the argument over
the desirability of limited liability in corporation law generally.2
rejected as a matter of common law, but sometimes by state statute or city charter. For an
example of the latter, see Rees v City of Watertown, 86 US 107, 120-21 (1873).
" Meriwether, 102 US at 519.
Id at 526 (Strong, dissenting in part on other grounds).
01 Emeric v Gilman, 10 Cal 404, 408-09 (1858).
See generally Tony Orhinial, ed, Limited Liability and the Corporation (Croom
Helm, 1982); Frank Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
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The central concern with limited liability is that it permits share-
holders acting through the corporation to externalize risk. By defi-
nition, nonconsensual creditors-tort victims, environmental
claimants and others-cannot negotiate with the shareholders to
extend their recourse from the assets of the corporation to the per-
sonal assets of the shareholders. Instead, limited liability forces
them to look only to the assets of the corporation. Shareholders
acting through the corporation therefore bear only part of the
downside risk associated with corporate actions; limited liability
allows them to dump risk on outsiders."3 This is a powerful argu-
ment against limitation of liability.
Treating each part owner of a corporation as jointly and sever-
ally liable for corporate liabilities to the full extent of his property,
however, is even more undesirable-which explains the extensive
worldwide adoption of some form of limited liability for corporate
associations. 4 Such an arrangement divorces potential liability
from potential gain; a billionaire owning one share of stock in
Johns-Manville would put his entire fortune at risk without receiv-
ing any commensurate claim on corporate profits. This would
render the public corporation an unusable form of financial organi-
zation. Even worse, each stockholder becomes the insurer not only
for the risk of corporate insolvency, but for the insolvency of his
fellow shareholders. If the corporation owes money in excess of its
assets, a solvent shareholder will be forced to assume the liabilities
of those who are insolvent. Moreover, the collection costs would be
astronomical: the creditor would sue a convenient shareholder for
the full amount of the debt, and the shareholder/defendant would
have to bring hundreds of thousands of suits against his fellow
shareholders for contribution. There are, in addition, as noted by
Justice Field in the municipal context, thorny questions of timing:
does liability attach to the shareholders at the time of the wrong-
doing, the time of the injury, the time of the filing of the lawsuit,
the time of the judgment, or some combination of the above?65 As
litigation over insurance coverage of asbestos tort liability demon-
tion, 52 U Chi L Rev 89 (1985); Philip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups, 11 J Corp L 573 (1986).
,3 See, for example, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Lia-
bility for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L J 1879 (1991). Note that in the private context, con-
sensual creditors can negotiate for personal guarantees, at least in the case of closed corpo-
rations. This alternative is not available in the municipal context.
" For a useful summary of the arguments, see Blumberg, 11 J Corp L at 611-22 (cited
in note 62).
" Emeric, 10 Cal at 408-09.
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strates,e6 these issues are not only unanswerable in theory, but are
easily subject to manipulation as well.67
There is an additional, perhaps subtler, defect in a regime of
unlimited liability for corporations. A key feature of the public cor-
poration is its separation of management from control, and a key
purpose of unlimited liability would be to give the shareholders the
incentive to monitor the activities of the managers so as to mini-
mize losses to third parties. But one difficulty with this is that lia-
bility will attach to those who devote their best efforts to monitor-
ing, just as it will those who are negligent or even malevolent.
Without more, shareholders will face a collective action problem,
making unlimited liability neither a reliable nor a fair way of im-
proving monitoring.
It should be readily apparent that in all these respects, the
question of limited liability for municipal corporations is essen-
tially the same as that for private corporations: unlimited personal
liability divorces risk from share of gain, thus discouraging other-
wise desirable "membership" in the city, it makes each citizen an
insurer of the risk of insolvency of his fellow citizens, it entails
enormous collection costs, it poses unanswerable questions of the
timing of liability with attendant effects on mobility, and it pun-
ishes the just along with the unjust. Justice Field's analysis of the
issues in Emeric v Gilman bears a close resemblance to the law
and economics literature on limited liability today. 8
6" See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 13 J Legal Stud 475, 495-505 (1984).
6 For a more extended discussion of the procedural problems raised by dropping lim-
ited liability, see Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Pro-
cedural Lens, 106 Harv L Rev 387 (1992), and the response thereto, Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability, 106 Harv L
Rev 446 (1992).
" One difference must be noted. The question of limited liability is significant in the
private context principally with regard to nonconsensual creditors (such as recipients of tort
judgments) because consensual creditors can bargain for additional security or guarantees.
These alternatives are not generally available to municipal consensual creditors because
most public property cannot be used as collateral, see text accompanying notes 14-42, and
because it is unlikely that private parties would serve as guarantors for municipal debt
(though the state might, and sometimes does). On the other hand, until recently municipali-
ties were immune from most forms of tort liability. Note, Municipal Tort Liability in Oper-
ation, 54 Harv L Rev 437, 438-45 (1941). See Molitor v Kaneland Community U ni4 District
No. 302, 18 Il 2d 11, 163 NE2d 89, 91-94 (1959). Thus, the,'question.of limited liability for
municipalities in the pre-Act perioci was principally relevant to consensualcreditors in the
municipal context,
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An intermediate approach between limited liability and un-
limited liability is pro-rata liability."9 Shareholders would be liable
for the debts of the corporation only to the extent of their propor-
tional investment (or right to share in the profits).70 One share-
holder does not serve as guarantor for another shareholder, and
this elimates the concern of disproportionate exposure for solvent
shareholders. It will not eliminate the collection costs associated
with unlimited liability and avoided by limited liability. The col-
lection costs are borne directly by the corporate creditor rather
than by a solvent shareholder, but this is unimportant. After the
fact, these collection costs simply transfer value, and if we ignore
distributional concerns, this gets us nothing. The important ques-
tion is whether the collection costs associated with pro-rata liabil-
ity buy us enough in return. Pro-rata liability for shareholders
might obviate most of the externalization of costs characteristic of
limited liability. With the shareholders exposed to additional risk,
they will have an incentive to monitor managers to guard against
inefficient risk.7 1
A case can be made that the law of municipal obligation
roughly approximates the proportional solution. As will be de-
scribed in detail below, the principal remedy if a city fails to pay
its debts is for the court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring a
tax levy sufficient to pay principal and interest due. In effect, this
forces citizens of the city to pay the liability in accordance with
their proportionate tax liability. It solves the collection problem by
using the already-existent tax system to collect the judgment and
implicitly resolves the timing question by attaching liability to the
citizens of the city in the fiscal year following entry of the writ.7 2
There is no need for the more draconian and less efficient remedy
of allowing suits directly against private citizens.
Whether pro-rata liability is a good rule depends on whether
citizens will be induced to monitor in order to avoid the extra taxes
and whether that increase in monitoring will more than offset a
" Yet another is some type of capped liability exposure. For a discussion of the history
and merits of one form of this, double liability in banking, see Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey R. Miller, Double Liability of Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 Wake
Forest L Rev 31 (1992).
70 See Blumberg, 11 J Corp L at 627-29 (cited in note 62).
"' Whether that incentive will result in monitoring depends on whether the collective
action problem faced by shareholders can be overcome. Also, the likely monitoring response
of creditors must be considered, as it is the net change in monitoring that matters.
'71 It should be noted that the inability of creditors to foreclose on public property effec-
tively 6liminates the ability of secured cieditors to separate themselves from the risks borne
by nonsecured creditors, which further exacerbates the monitoring problem.
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review
decrease in monitoring by municipal creditors. These creditors will
be able to avoid the substantial collection costs that they would
face in the private context, and thus they should take the pro-rata
remedy-in this case, the tax remedy-seriously. The relative col-
lective action problems faced by citizens, on the one hand, and
creditors, on the other, should determine this outcome. Citizens act
collectively through voting. Confronted with a tax increase due to
inefficient risk-taking by city managers, citizens may throw the
bums out. This may be enough of a threat to compensate for the
decrease in creditor monitoring. Thus, the ability to require a tax
levy to pay debts, which approximates the rule of pro-rata liability,
may very well be an efficient outcome.
And note where this puts the New England rule, which al-
lowed direct seizure of citizen property. Direct democracy in New
England towns mitigates collective action problems. Any doubts
about whether periodic votes by citizens on the fate of officehold-
ers suffices can be put to one side. The New England town meeting
makes citizens the best group for solving the collective action prob-
lem in monitoring and makes direct liability for citizens a more
sensible outcome then it would be elsewhere.
D. State Assumption of Municipal Indebtedness
It would have seemed in keeping with the constitutional status
of municipalities for creditors to seek payment from the state upon
default by the city. Cities were, after all, deemed to be mere crea-
tures of the state, exercising a portion of the state's sovereign
power for the benefit of the state and enjoying the state's immu-
nity from federal taxation.73 It was not to be so. During the rail-
road debt crises of the 1860s and 1870s, some state constitutional
conventions expressly prohibited the assumption of local debts, 4
and elsewhere the remedy was denied less officially. No case held a
state liable for the debts of its municipalities, and usually the ar-
gument was not even made.
This is not to say that states always left financially troubled
municipalities to their own devices. States frequently took action
to increase state aid to the struggling municipality and (in rare
cases) sometimes even formally assumed responsibility for repay-
ment of some portion of the debt. In 1927, Arkansas assumed the
' United States v Kagama, 118 US 375, 379-80 (1886); United States v Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., 84 US 322, 329 (1872). -
7' Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 323 n 6 (cited in note 38).
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debt service upon about $53 million of local road district
bonds-more than one-third of all local debts.1 5 Massachusetts es-
tablished a revolving fund account in 1933 from which municipali-
ties could borrow in case of short term cash flow problems." But it
was never thought that states had a legal obligation to do these
things, or that states stood behind the debts of their cities.
This practice makes the most sense when cities are envisioned
as creations of their own citizens for the purpose of providing a
higher level of government services than otherwise would be avail-
able. In this view, the citizens of the city-not the citizens of the
state-benefit from the city's expenditures and should be responsi-
ble for them. It makes less sense when cities are envisioned as
creatures of the state for the purpose of implementing state poli-
cies. Even then, however, one might appeal to the private law anal-
ogy of separately incorporated subsidiaries. The subsidiary may ex-
ist for the benefit of the parent, but that does not mean that the
parent is made liable for the debts of the sub. The reasons for lim-
ited liability in the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries are admit-
tedly weak,7 but there does not appear to be any reason to differ-
entiate between municipal and private corporations on this issue.
E. Lien on Future Tax or Other Revenues
Another remedy available to creditors in the private context is
to garnish a future stream of income. What would it mean to gar-
nish the future income of a municipality? It would be to garnish
payments owing to the city from private parties (before they are
remitted to the city), or to obtain a lien on tax revenues. As to
payments from private parties, the courts treated them as identical
to execution against city property: that is, if the payments were
made for general public purposes there could be no garnishment.78
Thus, in a typical case, a tort judgment creditor attempted to gar-
nish insurance proceeds owed to Pratt City, Alabama, as the result
75 Id at 332.
76 Id at 331.
77 See Blumberg, 11 J Corp L at 623-26 (cited in note 62).
76 Where bonds are secured by the revenues of a special fund, the bondholders were
recognized as having a right to receive those revenues and to block diversion of those reve-
nues to other n-rposes, including the pnyment of PPnprA] obligntionst of the municipality.
bed Unite Stites Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431U','IT-32 (1977f. This principle retains
force under the Bankruptcy Code. Matter of Sanitary & Improvement District No. 7, 98
Bankr 970, 974 (D Neb 1989) (Bankruptcy Code provides that "the lien on a stream of
payments from the governmental entity to revenue bondholders was not cut off by the filing
of bankruptcy").
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of a fire in certain public buildings. Notwithstanding the fact that
the buildings had already been rebuilt with other funds and the
insurance proceeds would therefore become part of the general
treasury, the Alabama Supreme Court held that garnishment was
barred by the "public purpose" doctrine. 9 On the other hand, the
same court in another case ordered garnishment of the proceeds of
the sale of city property not used for public purposes.8 0
A similar rule applied to garnishment of tax receipts. For ex-
ample, in Underhill v Calhoun,"' a judgment creditor filed suit
against a taxpayer who had given a note to the city for payment of
back taxes. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that "the taxes
and public revenues of [municipal] corporations cannot be seized
under executions against them, either in the treasury, or when in
transit to it.""2 The court frankly acknowledged that this rule was
contrary to "moral sense," but found it to be necessitated by "pub-
lic policy," in order to avoid "the disorder which would be thereby
produced in public accounts and administration." 3 The United
States Supreme Court proffered a more formalistic explanation for
the rule. Until taxes are collected, the Court stated, they "have
none of the elements of property which can be seized like debts by
attachment or other judicial process" and are thus "in no proper
sense of the term assets of the corporation. '84
Whatever its justification, the result is consistent with the rule
that creditors could not attach monies held in the public treasury,
which might be needed for the public good. If the funds could not
be attached once collected, it made little sense to say they could be
attached before they were collected. In effect, this implies that the
public good (as determined by the political processes of the city)
had automatic priority over the creditors. We should also note that
seizures of cash, future tax revenues, or debts owed to the city
often would not pose many of the risks associated with seizure of
other assets. The central concern is that seizures will separate effi-
cient combinations of assets-the generalized version of a left shoe
7 Ellis v Pratt City, 111 Ala 629, 20 S 649, 650-51 (1896).
8 Murphree v City of Mobile, 108 Ala 663, 18 S 740, 742 (1895). In Canal & Claiborne
Streets Railroad Co. v Hart, 114 US 654 (1885), the United States Supreme Court affirmed
a garnishment order directed to a company that owed monthly payments to the City of New
Orleans; but in that case, the defendant had not properly raised the argument that "the
debt of the corporation to the city was part of its public revenues, and not subject to seizure
or levy," so the decision cannot be taken as precedent on the point. Id at 662-63.
81 63 Ala 216 (1879).
81 Id at 218.
Id at 217-18.
Meriwether, 102 US at 514.
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and a right shoe. This may mean separating computer hardware
from software, printing press from plates or any of the other myr-
iad of possibilities. Cash, of course, is fungible. That makes it un-
likely that an asset synergy will be destroyed by its seizure. To be
sure, we should still worry about the incentives of creditors to at-
tempt to seize cash. A rule that bars such seizures prevents dupli-
cative races to the cash, and such races may be wasteful in and of
themselves. The only point to note is that the case against seizure
is probably weaker for future taxes than it is for other city assets.
F. Imposition of New Taxes
None of the creditors' remedies thus far discussed provided
much succor to the municipal creditor. Most were legally unavaila-
ble. Those that were available at all were limited to special circum-
stances, required special authorization, or were of little practical
use. The principal remedy, in practice, was one that has no analogy
in private law: the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring impo-
sition of new taxes.8 5 As described by the Supreme Court in the
Memphis default case:
When creditors are unable to obtain payment of their judg-
ments against municipal bodies by execution, they can pro-
ceed by mandamus against the municipal authorities to com-
pel them to levy the necessary tax for that purpose, if such
authorities are clothed by the legislature with the taxing
power; and such tax, when collected, cannot be diverted to
other uses.8 6
From a modern perspective, it may seem odd that courts
deemed themselves powerless to require cities to cut spending, sell
property, or turn over funds on hand because these directives
would intrude too deeply into the political discretion of municipal
authorities, but felt free to order a tax increase at the behest of
private parties-thus removing from political control a matter
83 Dillon, 4 Commentaries on Municipal Corporations § 1506 at 2673 (cited in note
57). See, for example, Maryland Casualty Co. v Leland, 214 NC 235, 199 SE 7, 9 (1938)
("From earliest times in this State, and generally elsewhere, mandamus has been recognized
as a proper proceeding to compel a levy of tax to pay a judgment against a municipality....
In fact, it is often the only remedy .... ."). See also Hasley v City of Chicago, 25 Ill 595, 598
(1861).
86 Meriwether, 102 US at 518. The continuing vitality of the mandamus remedy was
recently confirmed by the Supreme Court, in dicta, in considering the power of a federal
district court judge to raise property taxes as part of a remedial scheme for past desegrega-
tion. See Missouri v Jenkins, 495 US 33, 56-58 (1990).
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which from the days of the American Revolution and the earlier
struggles of Parliament against the King was considered at the
heart of republican government."s But the courts understood this
process not as interfering with the political discretion of the city
officials (as would blocking needless expenditures) but as enforcing
a plain duty imposed by other authority. The courts made clear
that the judiciary has absolutely no power to exercise the taxing
power. Indeed, in the very same case in which the mandamus rem-
edy was described in the previous paragraph, the Court pro-
nounced: "The levying of taxes is not a judicial act. It has no ele-
ments of one. It is a high act of sovereignty, to be performed only
by the legislature upon considerations of policy, necessity, and the
public welfare." ' The duty to levy taxes was not imposed by the
courts, but merely enforced by them. Where did the duty come
from?
In the typical case, the duty was imposed by state law. The
Illinois Constitution of 1870, for example, provided that the gen-
eral assembly "shall require that all the taxable property within
the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the payment
of debts contracted under authority of law,""9 and further required
"[a]ny county, city, school district, or other municipal corporation
[ ] incurring any indebtedess... [to] provide for the collection of a
direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it
falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof
within twenty years of the time of contracting the same."90 The
General Assembly discharged its responsibility by enactment of
the Cities and Villages Act of 1872, which required cities to include
payments on debt "to the sum authorized to be raised in the next
general tax levy."9 1 Another common approach was to incorporate
a requirement of this sort in the municipal charter.9 2 In most
states, therefore, the duty to levy taxes for the payment of munici-
87 Such an argument was made and rejected at the time. See, for example, Common-
wealth ex rel Armstrong v Commissioners of Allegheny, 37 Pa 277, 291-92 (1860) (rejecting
argument that "the exercise of the taxing power invoked by the relator, is an act of sover-
eignty resting in the will of the respondents [county commissioners], and cannot be
coerced").
88 Meriwether, 102 US at 515.
89 Ill Const of 1870, Art IX, § 10.
90 Id at Art IX, § 12.
91 Illinois Cities and Villages Act of 1872, Art 7, § 5.
92 See, for example, Commonwealth ex rel Hamilton v Select and Common Councils of
Pittsburgh, 34 Pa 496, 513 (1859).
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pal debts was a matter of explicit state constitutional and statu-
tory law.93
In other instances, the borrower would commit itself to levy
necessary taxes as part of the debt instrument itself. In these cases
the duty was self-imposed and made irrevocable by force of federal
constitutional law under the Contracts Clause. Indeed, since impo-
sition of taxes was the only means by which a creditor could expect
to be paid, it would have been difficult for a city to find takers for
a bond issue if there were no judicially-enforceable obligation
under either state law or contract to levy taxes for payment of
principal and interest.
Even in the absence of an express statutory obligation or con-
tractual undertaking to raise necessary taxes, this seemed so obvi-
ous a part of the obligation that courts were willing to interpret
the relevant instruments to authorize the mandamus remedy on
the ground that the duty to levy taxes is implied by the power to
issue debt.9 4 This did not mean, of course, that the duty was judi-
cially imposed-it was simply a matter of interpretation in light of
common expectations. Where there was a specific negative or nega-
tive implication, mandamus would not lie, for the courts had no
authority to order imposition of new taxes if there was no plain
duty under state law or contract. For example, in United States v
Macon County,95 the act authorizing the issuance of bonds pro-
vided for a tax of one-twentieth of one percent of assessed value
for satisfaction of the debt. The Supreme Court applied the maxim
expresssio unius est exclusio alterius to negate any implication of
a duty to impose a tax in excess of that level.9 8 Moreover, a city
could not circumvent limitations on its taxing authority by the de-
vice of borrowing: there could be no enforcement of debt where the
obligation did not arise under state law.9 7 Thus, in states in which
9 Most federal mandamus cases were of this sort. See, for example, Graham v Folsom,
200 US 248, 249 (1906) (bonds issued under state statute providing that the municipal of-
ficers "shall be authorized and required to assess an annual tax upon the property" within
the municipality to pay the debt).
I Scotland County Court v Hill, 140 US 41, 44-47 (1891); United States v New Orle-
ans, 98 US 381, 397 (1878); Commonwealth ex rel Armstrong, 37 Pa at 284, 290; Dillon, 4
Commentaries on Municipal Corporations § 1508 at 2681-84 (cited in note 57).
95 99 US 582 (1879).
"Id at 590.
97 The question of state law authorization was determined as of the time of the con-
tract. For a state, to deprive the city of its taxing power after the debt had been contracted
was deemed to be an impairment of the obligation of contract. Van Hoffman v City of
Quincy, 71 US 535, 549-55 (1866). See also Deere v Rio Grande County, 33 F Supp 823, 824
(D Colo 1888).
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the tax sources or maximum tax rates for the purposes of repaying
debt were limited by state law,"8 creditors could not obtain manda-
mus for any additional taxation.
For much the same reason, judgment creditors on noncontrac-
tual debts might have no effective remedy at all. In the absence of
a state law compelling the imposition of taxes for payment of judg-
ments, a city could indefinitely postpone payment of noncontrac-
tual obligations by the simple strategem of appropriating all reve-
nues to other public purposes.9
At times of general financial distress, the mandamus remedy
had serious practical drawbacks. To begin with, the power of the
court extends only to those obligations held by parties to the suit,
which means that a single filing by an impatient creditor will trig-
ger an avalanche of suits by bondholders who do not wish to be
last in line. This rush to collect through the mandamus remedy
replicates many of the concerns that made it sensible to insulate
city assets from seizure in the first place. 00 Second, the raising of
tax rates does not necessarily produce more revenue. The new
taxes tend to be resented and delinquency rates soar. With high
rates of delinquency, the only option available to creditors and
courts is to raise rates yet again, which exacerbates delinquencies
and effectively destroys the fiscal base of the city. Unusally high
rates of taxation also discourage economic activity and create an
incentive for business and higher income taxpayers to depart the
jurisdiction. Wealthier citizens and business are not only very sen-
sitive to changes in tax rates but are also the groups most capable
of relocating in order to escape the new tax burden.' 0 Third, the
enforcement of taxes through widespread tax sales of property is a
grim prospect, since the combination of high tax rates and numer-
ous sales can cause the bottom to drop out of the market. Manda-
mus thus works best if used only to enforce discrete obligations
unpaid by the city; it can become counterproductive in the case of
a general inability to pay. Yet in theory, the mandamus remedy
was generally deemed nondiscretionary, which meant that courts
had no choice but to raise tax levies, 02 even to unrealistically high
8 See, for example, Ark Const, Amend 62, §§ 1 and 2.
Louisiana v Mayor of New Orleans, 109 US 285, 287-90 (1883). For a more recent
example, see Bulls v Town of Jackson, 4 S2d 550, 553 (La Ct App 1942). This may still be
possible. See Evans v City of Chicago, 873 F2d 1007, 1017-18 (7th Cir 1989).
100 See text accompanying notes 19-26.
101 See Richard- Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
Colum L Rev 346, 408 (1990). 1 1
102 See Maryland Casualty Co v Leland, 214 NC 235, 199 SE 7, 9-10 (1938). " ,
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levels (though by the depth of the Depression, courts began to ex-
ercise equitable discretion 03 ).
Levels of taxes and delinquency rose to sometimes astonishing
levels during the Depression. In West Palm Beach, the property
tax rose to over forty percent of assessed valuation, of which only
about seven percent went for the operations of the city and the
rest to debt service.10 4 In Asheville, North Carolina-even after
slashing operating expenditures by half between 1931 and
1934-the city's debt burden was eighty-five percent of assessed
valuation, and tax delinquencies soared from twenty-one percent
to fifty-eight percent. 10 5 In Detroit in 1932, seventy-six percent of
tax revenues went to debt service and the tax delinquency rate was
thirty-six percent, or $28 million. Mayor (and future Supreme
Court Justice) Frank Murphy told Congress that, without relief,
the delinquency rate might rise to eighty percent. 08
Creditors thus had an incentive to negotiate debt relief, for to
invoke the only real legal remedy, mandamus, could precipitate a
financial meltdown that would leave creditors worse off than
before. But the final, and most serious, practical difficulty was the
absence of legal means to prevent holdouts from refusing to coop-
erate with the compromise solution. Often they would insist on ob-
taining more favorable terms than other creditors, which then
caused even willing compromisers to withdraw from the deal. A
representative of the organized creditors of fifty municipalities tes-
tified to Congress:
We usually try to reach an agreement with the city officials as
to what they are going to do in the way of meeting their obli-
gations .... We have, perhaps, anywhere from 75 to 95 per-
cent of the creditors who accept that settlement and then a
small minority will hold out and will prevent us from consum-
mating the settlement; we are never able to consummate it,
because of the few creditors who hold out and demand 100
cents on the dollar and, if we were to accept new obligations
on the refunded basis and extend our maturity for a long pe-
riod, it would simply enable them to come in and get a writ of
103 Faitoute Co. v Asbury Park, 316 US 502, 507-09 (1942).
104 Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 280 (cited in note 38).
106 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial Emergencies:
The Intergovernmental Dimension 21 (1973).
10" Hearings on HR 1670, HR 3083, HR 4311, HR 5009, and HR 5267 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 86 (1933) (statement of Mayor Frank
Murphy).
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mandamus to require a tax levy to settle in full for their
bonds and make a further tax levy impossible to collect and
endanger the refunding bonds and perhaps precipitate a de-
fault immediately on the new bonds. Consequently, the major-
ity creditors do not dare to consummate the contract which
has been agreed upon; neither does the municipality feel that
they can consummate it until those creditors have been
brought in line. 10 7
State law could not remedy this problem, because forcing an un-
willing creditor to compromise his claim would be an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the obligation of contract.
In theory, a state could authorize its cities to restrict the avail-
ability of the mandamus remedy if it did so prospectively. Thus it
might seem that the mandamus problem was self-inflicted, or at
least the product of insufficient foresight. In reality, however, cities
had little choice. Since there were no other effective creditors' rem-
edies, and since mandamus had come to be the standard, a city
that restricted the remedy prospectively would probably find itself
barred from the credit markets. The only solution was to change
the terms of the contract after the fact, a course of action prohib-
ited by the Contracts Clause. It was the necessity of changing con-
tracts after the fact and the difficulty of doing so with a large num-
ber of creditors that led to the creation of a federal municipal
bankruptcy act.
II. FEDERAL MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Passage of the Original Act
The first federal municipal bankruptcy statute, passed in
1933, was designed solely to deal with the holdout problem that
arose when individual creditors threatened to scotch negotiated
debt plans that were in the best interests of the debtor and the
creditors as a group. As explained by its principal sponsor:
The object and purpose of the bill is, of course, to enable
counties, towns, and tax districts to adjust their debts effec-
tively. In every instance where a governmental unit finds itself
in financial difficulty and is able to make some satisfactory
agreement of adjustment with the majority of its creditors,
there is always a small minority who hold out and demand
preferential treatment. These minority creditors are prompted
107 Id at 45 (statement of David M. Wood).
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in this action by the thought that someone will buy them out
rather than have the whole plan collapse. The difficulty, of
course, is that if one creditor by holding out can gain prefer-
ential treatment the others withdraw and nothing comes of
the efforts at settlement or adjustment. It is to remove this
difficulty that the bill has been drawn and introduced. If this
bill is enacted, the minority creditors will be forced to accept
the terms of adjustment which have been agreed upon by the
officials of the political subdivision and the vast majority of
creditors and approved by the court as being fair and
equitable." 8
The bill was passed at the instance of municipal officials, with the
acquiescence of representatives of the creditor class: trust estates,
insurance companies, endowment funds, pension funds, and other
major holders of municipal bonds.109
Under the bill, municipalities were permitted (not required) to
negotiate settlements of their debts with their creditors. The bill
did not permit the court to assume jurisdiction or control over the
expenditures, property, or other governing powers of the munici-
pality. Only if the settlement was approved by a certain percentage
of the creditors (seventy-five percent in the initial bill) could it be
imposed on the minority creditors. As a further safeguard, the
court was required to determine that the settlement plan was fair
and equitable, and the bill was limited to municipalities that had
authority under state law to take advantage of its provisions.
By a 5-4 vote, the Court struck down this first federal munici-
pal bankruptcy statute on constitutional grounds in Ashton v
Cameron County District,110 on the theory that it "might materi-
ally restrict respondent's control over its fiscal affairs.""' The
Court elaborated that "[i]f obligations of States or their political
subdivisions may be subjected to the interference here attempted,
they are no longer free to manage their own affairs; the will of Con-
gress prevails over them. 11 2
The reasoning of this decision is exceptionally weak. While a
plausible argument against the Act might have been based on the
rights of the creditors (perhaps that Congress could not extend its
108 Id at 22 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox).
109 Id at 40 (testimony of Charles Taylor, spokesman for Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company).
110 298 US 513 (1936).
m Id at 530.
1 Id at 531.
1993]
452 The University of Chicago Law Review [60:425
own Contracts Clause immunity to a state or local government),
the federalism-based reasoning of Ashton is impossible to defend.
The federal act carefully preserved local control over fiscal deci-
sions from judicial interference, as well as state power over
whether localities could take advantage of it. All the Act did was to
free cities of the limitations of the Contracts Clause and enable
them to negotiate settlements with their creditors without the
holdout problem. It is hard to see how the "will of Congress" is
made to prevail over the cities; on the contrary, cities are given an
additional tool for the management of their own affairs. Even
granting the underlying constitutional premise of dual federalism
(which is no longer given strict application), the Ashton decision
seems unnecessary and misguided.
Congress thought so too. The year after Ashton, Congress en-
acted a new municipal bankruptcy statute only slightly different
from the invalidated one. The statute was promptly challenged,
but this time it was upheld (over a dissent by the author of the
Ashton opinion). 1 3 In his argument before the Court, Solicitor
General Robert Jackson all but admitted that the sections of the
statute applicable to political subdivisions of the State would be
unconstitutional under Ashton, but quoted a member of Congress
to the effect that "it was not only the right, but the duty of Con-
gress to present the question once more to this Court, since the
decision, if allowed to stand, threatened grave impairment to the
powers of the States."1 " While not expressly overruling Ashton,
the Court upheld the new Act without identifying any specific
points of distinction from the earlier Act. This time, the Court un-
derstood the Act not as in derogation of state and local sover-
eignty, but as "in aid" of those powers. 15 According to the Court,
"[i]t is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts
and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental
power," and the bankruptcy statute removes an obstacle to doing
so. :" 6 The Court was also impressed with the practical exigencies of
the situation, in which the cities were in "distress," the power of
taxation was "useless," and the creditors were "helpless." "The
natural and reasonable remedy through composition of the debts
of the district was not available under state law by reason of the
restriction imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the impair-
113 United States v Bekins, 304 US 27 (1938).
"I Id at 33 (argument for the United States).
115 Id at 54.
I's Id at 51-52.
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ment of contracts by state legislation. The bankruptcy power is
competent to give relief to debtors in such a plight."1 7 The Court
indicated that the only possible constitutional obstacle might lie in
the right of the State to prevent a municipality from seeking bank-
ruptcy protection-an argument not relevant to this case, where
the State had consented.
The only changes of constitutional interest between the 1933
Act and the 1937 Act were that the 1937 Act (1) omitted the ex-
press provision of the 1933 Act requiring the approval of the bank-
ruptcy petition by the State, replacing it with the requirement that
a petitioning municipality show that it "is authorized by law to
take all action necessary to be taken by it to carry out the plan,"'18
and (2) excluded counties from the Act. The former change cannot
account for the change of result, because it diminished the power
of the state, thus exacerbating any federalism-based problems. The
change was, however, of little significance, since states still re-
tained the power to prevent their cities from declaring bank-
ruptcy.1 9 The main effect is to generate more uncertainty.1 20 The
latter change is interesting in that it implies that Congress consid-
ered counties to stand on a different constitutional footing than
other municipalities. In traditional state constitutional law, coun-
ties are not municipal corporations, but are* essential subdivisions
of the State and thus more closely resemble sovereign entities. It
might make sense to differentiate counties from municipal corpo-
rations for purposes of ordinary bankruptcy, because counties can-
not be dissolved (the entire area of a state is usually divided into
counties), while municipal corporations can (it is possible for areas
to be unincorporated). The distinction was of no relevance to the
1933 and 1937 Acts, however, since those Acts did not contemplate
dissolution of the municipal corporation but simply composition of
the debts, a remedy that is equally applicable to counties. In any
event, Congress amended the Act in 1946 to include counties,
and the distinction has no importance today.
The constitutional law of municipal default was further trans-
formed in 1942, in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v Asbury Park.1 22
Prior to Faitoute, it was assumed that states were incompetent to
11 Id at 53-54.
'is See Act of August 16, 1937, 50 Stat 654, 655 c 10 § 83(e)(6).
11 Benkins, 304 US at 49.
1"o See text accompanying notes 140-55.
"I Act of July 1, 1946, 60 Stat 409.
'22 316 US 502 (1942).
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provide relief for municipal debtors because any plan of involun-
tary composition of the debts would impair the obligation of the
creditor's contract, in violation of the Contracts Clause. Indeed, in
upholding the 1937 Act, the Court had noted that a federal statute
was necessary precisely because the Contracts Clause precluded
states from passing laws for the composition of municipal debts.123
In Faitoute, however, the Court upheld a 1933 New Jersey law
that permitted a plan of adjustment of municipal debt over the
objection of minority creditors, if the city and eighty-five percent
of the creditors agreed. The Court reasoned that such plans,
viewed realistically, do not impair the obligation of contract but
rather are "the only proven way for assuring payment of unsecured
municipal obligations."12 ' The traditional remedy of mandamus,
the Court said, was "empty."'2M And indeed, the municipal bonds
in question increased in value from sixty-nine to more than ninety
cents on the dollar after the plan of adjustment went into effect.1 26
Thus the state law, much like the federal, was premised on the
notion that both creditor and debtor would be made better off by
allowing refinancing of the debt, if only the problem of minority
holdouts could be overcome. 27
B. The Current Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
Municipal bankruptcy law thus originated from a desire to
control minority holdouts, and arose in a context of substantial un-
certainty over the appropriate relationship between federal and
state law. These issues still resonate in the current Chapter 9. We
look at four issues of particular interest in Chapter 9: (1) its peti-
tion filing requirements; (2) the scope of debtor autonomy; (3) its
plan confirmation rules; and (4) the status of collective bargaining
agreements.
12M Bekins, 304 US at 54.
' Faitoute, 316 US at 512.
125 Id at 515.
126 Id at 513.
127 The specific holding of Faitoute was reversed by Congress: federal law now prohibits
states from exercising any power they might have to compel composition of municipal debt.
See 11 USC § 903(1) (1988). In these authors' judgment, this feature of the Act is far more
questionable on federalism grounds than was the 1933 Act. For further discussion of its
practical implications, see text accompanying notes 222-28.'
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1. Filing under Chapter 9.
Federal bankruptcy law12 is divided into chapters, odd chap-
ters, at that (save for an even-numbered chapter for family farmers
added in 1986129). Chapter 9 covers municipalities, but the single
most important provision for municipal bankruptcy is set forth in
§ 109(c), which serves as the gatekeeper for filings under Chapter
9.130 Only municipalities may file under Chapter 9 and they cannot
fie elsewhere.1"' Municipalities, like farmers and charitable corpo-
rations, are not subject to an involuntary bankruptcy petition.1 2
To the bankruptcy newcomer, § 109(c) may appear unremarkable:
other than the requirement that the debtor be a municipality,Lss
the section requires only that the debtor be insolvent, have worked
out a plan to deal with its debts or have failed in trying, and be
authorized to file for bankruptcy. Subsection (c) becomes interest-
ing only when contrasted with the rest of § 109.
Other debtors face fewer impediments to filing. For example,
we do not insist that other debtors filing voluntarily meet any
11 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 USC §§ 101 et seq, as amended (1988 &
supp 1991).
I Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 11 USC §§ 1201 et seq (1988).
13* Section 109(c) provides that:
(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity-
(1) is a municipality;
(2) is generally authorized to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity
to be a debtor under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a
case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agree-
ment of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that
such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable;
or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is
avoidable under section 547 of this title.
"I The "if and only if" language in § 109(c), has the effect of making municipalities
eligible under Chapter 9 and limiting Chapter 9 to municipalities. To conclude that munici-
palities cannot file under Chapters 7 or 11 takes a bit more work. Section 109(b) establishes
eligibility for filings under Chapter 7 and limits that to "persons," defined in § 101(41).
This definition excludes governmental units, which (as defined in § 101(27)) includes mu-
nicipalities. Chapter 11 eligibility under § 109(d) is defined through Chapter 7 eligibility,
and therefore a municipality is not eligible under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.
-3 11 USC § 303(a) (limiting involuntary petitions to cases under Chapter 7 or 11).
133 "Municipality" is defined as a political subdivision or public agency or instrumental-
ity of a State. 11 USC § 101(40).
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threshhold test of solvency. As bankruptcy has become more famil-
iar, the cry has gone out that debtors now abuse the process, and
that even solvent companies may find it worthwhile to file for
bankruptcy. 3 4 Nonetheless, only a municipality faces a statutory
requirement of insolvency. In this context, insolvency means that
the municipal debtor either currently cannot pay its debts as they
become due-the bills arrive and cannot be paid-or that the
debtor will not be able to pay such debts as they become
due-bills will arrive in six months and cannot be paid then.13 5
This is a cash flow insolvency test. The test for current insolvency
is akin to the test for an involuntary petition set out in § 303(h),
but the prospective cash flow test appears nowhere else in the
Bankruptcy Code."3 " Both tests differ from the balance sheet insol-
vency test used in most other bankruptcy contexts: for municipal
debtors the Code looks to cash flow, while for other debtors it
looks to assets and liabilities.3 7 A city may be "insolvent" even if
it has extensive and valuable assets. This reflects the pre-Code
common law view, which treated the municipal debtor as having
few physical assets available for creditors and instead focused al-
most exclusively on the ability of the debtor to generate revenues
through property taxes. 38
The insolvency standard delays and discourages municipal
bankruptcy filings and thus serves as an effective gatekeeper. For
example, in the most prominent municipal filing since adoption of
the 1978 Code, Bridgeport, Connecticut, was running a $16 million
annual deficit, had the highest effective tax rates in the State, and
was in dire financial straits. But it had not yet exhausted its bor-
rowing power and thus would not "run out of cash" in the next
fiscal year. The court accordingly held that it was not insolvent. 39
While the gatekeeper function reduces the moral hazard of easy
debt relief, the insolvency standard almost certainly makes both
creditors and debtor worse off in those cases actually culminating
in bankruptcy. It postpones the day of reckoning, while the city
continues to pile on new debt at ever-increasing interest rates, fur-
1'3 See, for example, Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the
Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 Iowa L Rev 199 (1985).
131 11 USC § 101(32)(C).
13' See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 Bankr 332, 336-37 (Bankr D Conn 1991); In re
Villages at Castle Rock Metro. Dist No. 4, 145 Bankr 76, 84 (Bankr D Colo 1990). See also
the discussion in Dubrow, 24 Urban Law at 557-60 (cited in note 1).
'37 See 11 USC § 101(32)(A),(B).
13 See the discussion of creditors' remedies at text accompanying notes 85-107.
139 Bridgeport, 129 Bankr at 337-38.
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ther burdening the municipal budget and guaranteeing that each
creditor will receive less value in bankruptcy. The problem is not
easy to solve, because the insulation of municipal assets from
seizure and sale makes the idea of balance sheet insolvency mean-
ingless, and there is no obvious alternative. We will return to this
issue below.
The second important limit on municipal filings-that the
state authorize the debtor to file-has roots in the constitutional
principle that the federal government may not interfere with the
internal governance of a state or its political subdivisions. Section
109(c)(2) preserves the power of the states to determine the extent
to which their political subdivisions have access to the powers of
the bankruptcy court. There was, and still may be, substantial
doubt about the constitutionality of depriving a state of the power
to determine which of its subdivisions can file for bankruptcy.
140
Section 109(c)(2) is intended to sidestep this problem, though the
actual language of the section is difficult to apply and creates need-
less uncertainty. Although some states authorize filings quite di-
rectly141 and at least one state bars filings, equally directly, 42 most
states occupy a middle ground. 43
10 See Bekins, 304 US at 49 (leaving open the question of whether state consent is
constitutionally required).
141 See, for example, Neb Rev Stat § 13-402 (1991):
Any county, city, village, school district, agency of the state government, drainage dis-
trict, sanitary and improvement district, or other political subdivision of the State of
Nebraska is hereby permitted, authorized, and given the power to file a petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court under 11 U.S.C. chapter 9 and any acts amendatory
thereto and supplementary thereof and to incur and pay the expenses incident to the
consummation of a plan of adjustment of debts as contemplated by such petition.
142 See Ga Code Ann § 36-80-5 (Michie 1987):
(a) No county, municipality, school district, authority, division, instrumentality, politi-
cal subdivision, or public body corporate created under the Constitution or laws of this
state shall be authorized to file a petition for relief from payment of its debts as they
mature or a petition for composition of its debts under any federal statute providing
for such relief or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any federal statute
providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public agencies and
instrumentalities.
(b) No chief executive, mayor, board of commissioners, city council, board of trustees,
or other governmental officer, governing body, or organization shall be empowered to
cause or authorize the filing by or on behalf of any county, municipality, school district,
authority, division, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate cre-
ated under the Constitution or laws of this state of any petition for relief from payment
of its debts as they mature or a petition for composition of its debts under any federal
statute providing for such relief or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any
federal statute providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and pub-
lic agencies and instrumentalities.
143 One commentator puts the numbers at seventeen authorizing, one barring and the
rest in the squishy middle. See Jeffrey Cohen, Declining Health of U.S. Cities Raises New
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In the Bridgeport case, the city was held to have state authori-
zation to file for bankruptcy despite the strenuous opposition of
the state itself.14 4 The court found authorization in the general
power to sue and be sued and was not deterred by the state's pas-
sage of a Special Act establishing a Financial Review Board to
oversee Bridgeport's financial affairs and to restore the city to fi-
nancial stability, nor by the opposition of that Board to the bank-
ruptcy petition. It is for states-like Connecticut-that lack ex-
press provisions either way that the "generally authorized"
language must be interpreted (read, must be litigated).145
The court's evidently high opinion of bankruptcy carried the
day, an approach impossible to reconcile with the statute's defer-
ence to state law. A better approach would be to presume that
home rule jurisdictions are authorized to file, in the absence of
contrary state law, and to require specific authorization in other
cases. 4' Under the traditional understanding of municipal power,
cities are strictly limited to the powers vested in them by state
legislatures, and any substantial doubt about the existence of
Interest in Chapter 9, Natl L J 15 col 1 (Aug 5, 1991). Looming in the background of this
issue, but not resolved in litigation, is whether general state constitutional provisions requir-
ing municipalities to make adequate provision for the payment of debts should be in-
tepreted as barring bankruptcy filings. See Flushing National Bank v Municipal Assistance
Corp., 358 NE2d 848, 40 NY2d 731 (1976). If so, Chapter 9's availability may be far more
constricted than is usually thought.
144 Bridgeport, 128 Bankr at 698-99. The City of Bridgeport deserves special mention in
any account of the history of municipal bankruptcy. In the 1830s, Bridgeport found itself in
financial difficulties, and sought ways to avoid payment of its debts by claiming that the
debts had not been lawfully incurred and were not judicially enforceable. In response, the
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute providing that the securities issued by the city
would be legally enforceable, and the Supreme Court of the State subsequently held that
creditors could seize the private property of the city's inhabitants to pay the debts. Beards-
ley v Smith, 16 Conn 368, 376 (1844). Eighty years later, in 1925, the City again was on the
brink of default. This time the State averted financial disaster by stripping local officials of
their authority over the financial affairs of the city and by establishing a blue-ribbon board
of commissioners with the power to revise and approve city budgets and to appoint and
supervise the tax assessor. The commissioners served without compensation and restored
the City to financial soundness by the end of 1931. Their success made the Bridgeport re-
ceivership a nationwide model. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds at 326-27 (cited in note 38). Yet
60 years later, Bridgeport earned the distinction of being the first large American city to file
for bankruptcy under the Code.
I'l For a representative sample, see Bridgeport, 128 Bankr at 693-96; Castle Rock, 145
Bankr at 82-84; In re City of Wellston, 43 Bankr 348, 350 (Bankr E D Mo 1984); In re
Pleasant View Utility Dist. of Cheatham Cty., 27 Bankr 552, 553 (Bankr M D Tenn 1982).
14 For a related proposal, see Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem With
Chapter 9 Eligibility-A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 Ariz St L J
625, 635-37 (1990).
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power should be resolved against it. 147 In such a system, a city
should not be permitted to file for bankruptcy without specific per-
mission from the state, and vague language such as the right to
"sue and be sued" should not be stretched to cover the case. By
contrast, home rule powers typically extend to all matters that are
"local and municipal" in character,148 or that are "not denied" by
its charter or by state law.149 The power to fie for bankruptcy is a
natural element of the autonomy enjoyed by home rule jurisdic-
tions. Even in home rule jurisdictions, however, courts should give
effect to state law abrogating the right, unless such law is itself
subject to challenge under the state constitution.1 50 Nonetheless, in
the general case, in the absence of state constitutional issues of
this sort, when a state has passed specific legislation addressing the
situation of a distressed municipality, it should be presumed to oc-
cupy the field, and the court should not allow federal bankruptcy
law to interfere with the state's plan.1 5'
The Bridgeport decision may serve as a negative example. The
Bridgeport Special Act gave the Financial Review Board certain
supervisory powers over the city's financial affairs "in order to
maintain access to public credit markets, to fund the city's accu-
mulated deficits and to restore financial stability to the town and
city of Bridgeport.' 1 52 The stated intention to enable the city "to
fund [its] accumulated deficits" suggests that the State wished to
avoid bankruptcy; but the court found "no reason to believe that a
bankruptcy case is inconsistent with the purposes of the Special
Act, i.e., the restoration of financial stability through enhanced ac-
cess to public credit markets. Indeed, the restoration of the finan-
cial stability of a troubled city is precisely what Congress designed
1,17 See Dillon, 1 Commentaries on Municipal Corporations § 237(89) at 448-55 (cited
in note 57).
148 See, for example, Colo Const, Art XX, § 6; Maine Const, Art 8, Part 2d, § 1.
149 See, for example, Pa Const, Art 9, § 2; SD Const, Art IX, § 2.
150 In addition to vesting home rule powers in qualifying municipalities, some state con-
stitutions restrict the power of the state legislature to pass supervening legislation. Others
do not. Whether interference with the bankruptcy power would fall within the former pro-
tections is a matter that must be addressed on a state-by-state basis. Under the Connecticut
Constitution, the question would be whether the Bridgeport Special Act is a "matter of
purely local concern." Conn Const, Art Tenth. In view of the traditional state involvement
with issues of local indebtedness and the potential statewide impact of default, we consider
this an unlikely interpretation.
" For a contrary argument that state legislation arguably nullifying the home rule
power to file for bankruptcy should be narrowly construed, see Rachel E. Schwartz, This
Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport's Chapter 9 Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 Am
Bankr L J 103, 126-27 & n 124 (1992).
15" Conn Special Act No 88-80, § 1, quoted in Bridgeport, 129 Bankr at 691 n 1.
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chapter 9 to accomplish.' 153 The court's paraphrase conveniently
elided the statutory language about funding the debt. More impor-
tantly, it presumed that Congress's view that bankruptcy is the
best way to -restore financial stability to a troubled city should take
precedence over the State's contrary view. In effect, Bridgeport.
was attempting to use federal bankruptcy as an alternative (per-
haps an escape) from the strictures of state supervision, and the
courts' substantive faith in bankruptcy prevailed over the Act's
careful reservation of state authority. 54
States may have a substantial interest in preventing their mu-
nicipalities from declaring bankruptcy. The creditworthiness of all
the cities in a state may be impaired if any city walks out on its
debts by filing for bankruptcy. Creditors may understand the state
itself to stand ready to come to the aid of its municipalities. The
possibility of state aid, or the state functioning as a quasi-guaran-
tor, may make it easier for all of the municipalities in a state to
borrow in the credit markets. A state's reluctance to aid a finan-
cially distressed municipality puts this implicit guarantee at risk; a
bankruptcy filing by a municipality would be an especially visible
default by the state on its implicit guarantee and would shatter the
illusion of meaningful state backing. Such a filing would therefore
raise credit costs for all municipalities in the state. Perhaps this
explains why Connecticut resisted Bridgeport's petition so strenu-
ously, and why so few states have been willing to allow their cities
access to a federal law passed expressly for their benefit. 155
There are two additional limits on filings by municipalities:
§ 109(c) imposes a procedural bar and § 921(c) empowers the
bankruptcy court to dismiss petitions not fied in "good faith."
The procedural bar mandates certain pre-filing efforts by the mu-
nicipal debtor to work out its financial difficulties. It must either
have reached an agreement sufficient to confirm a plan under
Chapter 9, have failed to do so despite good faith negotiations, or
such negotiation must be "impracticable." Again, these require-
ments are unique to the Chapter 9 debtor. While most private
debtors do engage in pre-petition negotiations and while some do
reach an agreement to be enforced through the bankruptcy
1'3 Bridgeport, 128 Bankr at 1702.
I" Of course, states can solve this problem by being explicit in barring access to the
federal bankruptcy power. It might well be sensible for states that set up financial oversight
boards to invest those boards with the discretion to determine whether the city should file.
155 Compare Dennis Epple and Chester Spatt, State Restrictions on Local Debt5 Their
role in preventing default, 29 J Pub Econ 199 (1986).
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court-this is the heart of the "prepackaged plan," the latest rage
in bankruptcy practice-nothing obligates private debtors to nego-
tiate. The same holds for the good faith filing requirement. Good
faith is a common requirement in the world at large axd appears
with some frequency in the Bankruptcy Code,156 but only in
§ 921(c) is an explicit good faith requirement included as a thresh-
hold to filing.157 The case law is too sparse to cast much light on its
meaning in this new procedural context.
The Bankruptcy Code thus erects serious obstacles to munici-
pal filing beyond those faced by private debtors. Not surprisingly,
there have been very few filings. From January 1972 to June 1984,
municipalities filed only twenty-one petitions under Chapter
915 8-and Bridgeport is the only large city even to have attempted
it. During this same period, I number of cities came close to de-
fault and required intervention into their financial affairs under
state law.159 This suggests that, for most cities, federal bankruptcy
law is of less importance than state procedures addressing the
prospect of municipal insolvency.
It is possible-but ultimately implausible-that the statutory
barriers are not the primary cause of this result and instead that
fears of adverse reactions from the credit markets keep municipali-
ties out of bankruptcy. Private debtors want to return to the credit
markets as well, and yet we see no shortage of filings by them. In-
deed, companies now file for bankruptcy precisely because it
makes applicable the special borrowing rules of § 364. It thus
seems unlikely that market concerns explain the relative paucity of
municipal filings.
156 See, for example, §§ 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), and 1325(a)(3) of the Bridgeport Act.
Examples of the use of "good faith" in the Code can be found at 11 USC §§ 109(c)(5)(B),
363(m), 364(e), 542(c)-(d), 548(c), 549(c), 550(b), 550(d)(1), 727(a)(9)(B)(ii), 1113(b)(2),
1114(f)(2), 1125(e), 1126(e),'1129(a)(3), 1144(1), 1225(a)(3), 1325(a)(3).
157 For an application of this standard, see Castle Rock, 145 Bankr at 81. For an inter-
esting discussion of this issue in the Bridgeport case-where the city found itself repudiat-
ing a prior opinion of the city's bond counsel in a preliminary bond offering statement to the
effect that Bridgeport was not authorized to file for bankruptcy-see Schwartz, 66 Am
Bankr L J at 130-33 (cited in note 151). The courts are not particularly fastidious about
where good faith standards are used in the Code however, and a judicially-created require-
ment of good faith in filing may be emerging. See Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knip-
penberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy
Policy, 85 Nw U L Rev 919, 924-48 (1991).
14 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Bankruptcies, Defaults, And
Other Local Government Financial Emergencies 8 (1985).
159 See text accompanying notes 203-11.
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2. Control over the debtor during bankruptcy.
Another major difference between municipal and private
bankruptcy is the degree of control exercised by the court over the
debtor during the proceeding. Under the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act,
managers of non-municipal corporate debtors gave up control to a
trustee under chapter X, but retained control under the other reor-
ganization chapters, XI and XII. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, in
forming a single reorganizations chapter, Chapter 11, created de-
feasible control rights: the debtor controls its own affairs as the
debtor-in-possession, e0  but a trustee may be appointed to manage
the estate for cause. 6' In contrast, a trustee is mandatory in liqui-
dations under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.162
Chapter 9 explicitly protects the rights of the state to control
its political subdivisions and the right of the municipal debtor to
manage its internal affairs. Section 903 preserves the state's power
to control a municipality "in the exercise of political or govern-
mental powers," save for limiting the ability of the states to bind
nonconsenting creditors to nonbankruptcy debt compositions . 63
This explicit limitation was added to overturn the holding in
Faitoute. The application only to political or governmental powers
seems to recognize the traditional distinction in local government
law between proprietary and nonproprietary activities of munici-
palities.' Section 904 provides that the bankruptcy court may not
interfere with the "political or governmental powers of the
debtor," the "properties or revenues of a debtor" or the "debtor's
use of or enjoyment of any income-producing property."' 65 Thus,
160 See 11 USC § 1107.
,6 See 11 USC § 1104(a).
162 See 11 USC §§ 701-03.
16 § 903. Reservation of State power to control municipalities
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or
otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or govern-
mental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but-
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such mu-
nicipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not
consent to such composition.
I" See text accompanying notes 14-42.
16g
§ 904. Limitation on jurisdiction and powers of court
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so
provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise,
interfere with-
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
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the state's power is preserved with respect to governmental func-
tions only, while the city's power is preserved with respect to both
governmental and proprietary functions. This may or may not
have any practical significance, because the governmental/proprie-
tary distinction has all but collapsed.
Taken together, sections 903 and 904 carry forward doctrines
of federal common law that had governed municipal insolvency
before the first federal act,166 as well as the constitutional principle
against federal interference in state and local governance-a prin-
ciple that has no corollary in private bankruptcy law. The effect is
to preserve the power of political authorities to set their own do-
mestic spending priorities, without restraint from the bankruptcy
court. 6 7 Of course, the states may so restrain their municipalities,
within the bounds of state constitutional law. State laws dealing
with the problem of distressed municipalities commonly provide
for a transfer of control over municipal affairs,'68 which confirms
that this principle of noninterference is an artifact of federalism
rather than part of the inherent autonomy of local governance.
3. Plans for the adjustment of debts.
The heart of Chapter 9 is the plan for the adjustment of the
debtor's debts, just as a plan of reorganization is central to Chap-
ter 11. The plan solves the holdout problem that gave rise to fed-
eral municipal bankruptcy. The current Chapter 9 maintains the
essential structure of the original act, but the precise scope of in-
stitutional protection for creditors is unclear.
The municipal debtor controls the plan and has the exclusive
right to file it. This "exclusivity" is absolute, rather than for a de-
fined period as in Chapter 11.169 The power to confirm a plan of
arrangement allows the debtor to modify the terms of existing debt
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
166 See text accompanying notes 14-107.
167 This overstates somewhat as the revenues---"special revenues," actually, as defined
in 11 USC § 902(2)-typically associated with revenue bonds are insulated from invasion by
the debtor and are thereby preserved to the bondholders to whom they have been pledged.
See 11 USC § 928. For more extended discussion, see Robert S. Amdursky, The 1988 Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy Amendments: History, Purposes, and Effects, 22 Urban Law 1 (1990).
168 See, for example, Pennsylvania Financially Distressed Municipalities Act, 53 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 11701.221 (Purdon, Supp 1992). See also Richard Emmett, et al, Coping
with Fiscal Distress in Pennsylvania's Local Governments: A Program Evaluation of Act
47, 121-38 (Penn State, Department of Public Administration, 1991) (summarizing nine
states' fiscal distress legislation). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 206-
11.
168 Compare 11 USC § 941 with 11 USC § 1121.
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instruments.17 0 A plan may be confirmed if the requisite class votes
are obtained, but as always in bankruptcy, the critical question is
what the debtor can do over the objection of creditors. These
"cramdown" powers ultimately determine the shape and scope of
the plan of arrangement. They do so expressly, when the municipal
debtor confirms the plan .over the objection of creditors; and they
do so implicitly, when the consensual deal negotiated between the
municipal debtor and the creditors reflects-as it inevitably
will-the outcome that the debtor can achieve without agreement.
The standards for confirming a Chapter 9 plan are lengthy
and complex.17 1 Nonetheless, the cramdown powers are fairly
straightforward. Chapter 9 incorporates the Chapter 11 require-
ment that at least one impaired class of claims approve the plan."'
It also incorporates Chapter l1's cramdown protections for secured
and unsecured creditors. For secured creditors, this means that
they are to receive at least the value of the property securing their
claims.17 3 For unsecured creditors, it may mean very little. The in-
corporated Chapter 11 standard requires that unsecured creditors
either receive full payment of their claims (perhaps over time) or
that holders of junior claims and interests receive nothing. In the
context of the private corporation, this means that objecting un-
secured creditors are entitled to be paid in full, so long as stock-
holders receive any value on account of their stock. Cities, how-
ever, have no stockholders. The current managers-that is, the
current officeholders-owe their allegiance to the citizens who put
them into control, not to the creditors. The managers need not pay
off unsecured creditors to remain in control, but instead can retain
control while confirming a plan giving unsecured creditors very lit-
tle. In the extreme, the debtor might be able to abrogate the claims
of the unsecured creditors altogether, so long as it can find an im-
paired class of secured claims willing to approve the plan. That is a
very real possibility, given the possibility of gerrymandering
classes.1 4
170 See, for example, In re City of Columbia Falls, Montana, Special Imp. Dist. No. 25,
143 Bankr 750, 759-61 (Bankr D Mont 1992).
171 See 11 USc § 943, plus the provisions incorporated by § 901 from Chapter l1's
standards.
172 See 11 USC § 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(a)(10)).
173 See 11 USC § 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(b)(2)(A)).
174 For an extended discussion of the initial disapproval of gerrymandering in the case
law, its renaissance, and (perhaps) its ultimate decline, see Peter E. Meltzer, Dise nranchis-
ing the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification or Artificial Impairmnient, 66
Am Bankr L J 281, 281-82 (1992).
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The incorporated Chapter 11 cramdown standard is therefore
of cold comfort to unsecured creditors. They would instead look
for protection to § 943(b)(7), which requires the court to deter-
mine that the plan is in the "best interests of creditors and is feasi-
ble." This is old language; it was the key test for confirming plans
of arrangement under Chapters XI and XII of the Bankruptcy
Act 117 and was also applicable under prior versions of Chapter 9.176
"Feasible" means that the court believes that the debtor can fulfill
the plan.177 "Best interests" is less well-defined. Under Chapters
XI and XII, the term usually referred to the amount that the cred-
itors would receive in a liquidation of the debtor. As the legislative
history noted, that could not be the standard under Chapter 9 be-
cause municipalities are not liquidated in bankruptcy. 1 7
The legislative history points instead toward two pre-Code de-
cisions, Kelley v Everglades Drainage District7 9 and Fano v New-
port Heights Irrigation District.1 80 In Fano, an irrigation district
had fallen behind on payments on an outstanding bond issue, in
part, because the district had undertaken extensive renovations
and had paid for them on a current basis. The district sought relief
under Chapter IX and sought to reduce the outstanding indebted-
ness. The district court confirmed the plan, but the appellate court
reversed, stating that:
In view of the small amount of deficiency in tax payments
shown by the 1937 financial statements of the District, we are
unable to find any reason why the tax rate should not have
175 See 11 USC §§ 766(2), 872(2) (1976).
176 Act of August 16, 1937, PL 75-302, 50 Stat 655 c 10 § 83(e)(1).
177 Kane v Johns-Manville, 843 F2d 636, 649 (2d Cir 1988) (whether plan offers reason-
able assurance of success); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 Bankr 660, 684
(Bankr D DC 1992) (same); Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 Bankr at 975.
178 The legislative history states that:
The best interest of creditors test does not mean liquidation value as under chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act. In making such a determination, it is expected that the court
will be guided by standards set forth in Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319
U.S. 415 (1943) and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F. 2d 563 (9th Cir.
1940), as under present law, the bankruptcy court should make such findings as de-
tailed as possible to support a conclusion that this test has been met.
124 Cong Rec 32,403 (Sep 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep Edwards). Finally, paragraph (6) re-
quires that the plan be in the best interest of creditors and feasible. "[In § 1129(a)(7)], the
test is phrased in terms of liquidation of the debtor. Because that is not possible in a munic-
ipal case, the test here is phrased in its more traditional form, using the words of art 'best
interest of creditors.'" Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess
400 (1979).
179 319 US 415 (1943).
28 114 F2d 563 (9th Cir 1940).
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been increased sufficiently to meet the District's obligations or
why it can be said that the plan is "equitable" and "fair" and
for the "best interest of the creditors" with no sufficient show-
ing that the taxing power was inadequate to raise the taxes to
pay them.18
1
In Kelley, the Supreme Court agreed with a bondholder's chal-
lenge to a proposed plan of arrangement. The Court held that the
fairness of the plan could not be evaluated without specific find-
ings about the extent to which the municipal district could pay the
bonds through tax revenues.""2 The lower court had concluded that
the bondholders were "receiving all they [could] reasonably expect
under the circumstances,"'18 3 which was then a common reformula-
tion of the best interests test.""4
Looking to the taxing power of these special districts as the
prime source of payment is hardly surprising given the history of
creditor's remedies against municipal entities. It would ensure that
bondholders effectively receive what they would have received
outside of bankruptcy if they were able to obtain mandamus relief
requiring an increase in the tax levy. Of course, these cases in-
volved only special districts-a drainage district in Kelley and an
irrigation district in Fano' 5-but we see no reason why the same
standard should not apply to general-purpose municipalities as
well.
As should now be apparent, unsecured creditors of municipali-
ties are protected from the moral hazard problem of opportunistic
bankruptcy filings not by the cramdown limit but by the best in-
terests of the creditors standard. Tying that standard to potential
tax revenues would put some bite into it. We therefore believe that
the interpretation of the best interests standard suggested by the
legislative history should be embraced. Even this approach, how-
ever, leaves considerable room for judicial discretion and municipal
gamesmanship. At a certain point, raising tax rates ceases to raise
tax revenues,' 8 but identifying the tax-maximization point on this
implicit "Laffer Curve" is not a simple proposition. Presumably
1s Id at 565-66.
182 319 US at 419-21.
183 Kelley v Everglades Drainage Dist., 132 F2d 742, 744 (9th Cir 1943).
18, See West Coast Life Ins. Co. v Merced Irrigation District, 114 ,9.d A.5, 678 (9tblCir
1940). See also Lorber v Vista Irrigation District, 127 F2d 628, 639 (tWol1942).
188 Case law under the Bankruptcy Code is extremely limited. In the Matter of Sani-
tary & Imp. Dist., No. 7, 98 Bankr 970 (Bankr D Neb 1989) involves yet another special
district.
188 See id at 976.
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city officials are entitled to some deference regarding the probable
effects of additional taxation on the community, which means that
the moral hazard remains.
4. Collective bargaining agreements and the municipal
debtor.
As a matter of political reality, the financial situation of a mu-
nicipality is often directly related to the city's existing contracts
with its employees. Collective bargaining agreements with police
officers, firefighters, teachers, garbage collectors, and other munici-
pal employees impose substantial financial burdens on municipali-
ties and are often the apparent source of a municipality's current
financial difficulty. Bridgeport, for example, pointed to unafford-
able union contracts as a key source of its financial difficulties.""'
All of this makes the status of those contracts in bankruptcy a
matter of some importance.
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code deals with executory con-
tracts and empowers the debtor to assume or reject such contracts.
Assumption effectively means that the debtor remains liable on the
terms of the contract, while rejection more or less constitutes a
breach of contract. Under § 365(g), the debtor is liable for dam-
ages for such a breach, but the liability will be treated as an un-
secured claim, and thus is typically not satisfied in full.
There is little reason to distinguish collective bargaining con-
tracts from any other executory contract. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v Bildisco & Bildisco18s
that collective bargaining agreements were within the ambit of
§ 365. Congress, however, responded almost immediately to the
Bildisco decision by adding § 1113, which substantially limits the
power of the Chapter 11 debtor to reject collective bargaining
agreements. Without explanation, and possibly through inadver-
tence, Congress neglected to make this section applicable to Chap-
ter 9.18"9 Unlike private debtors, therefore, municipal debtors might
be able to unilaterally abrogate collective bargaining agreements,
subject only to liability for damages for breach of contract.19 This
"" See Bridgeport, 129 Bankr at 339.
I's 465 US 513 (1984).
Ise Th- -- me .2 true of special retiree benefit legislation set forth in § 1114 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 USC § 901(a).
"' As others have previously noted. See Schwartz, 66 Am Bankr L J at 120 (1992)
(cited in note 151); W. Richard Fossey and John M. Sedor, In re Cooper River School Dis-
trict: Collective Bargaining and Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy, 6 Alaska L Rev 133, 142
(1989).
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result is not wholly without doubt, as Bildisco involved the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act rather than state law. In addition, given
the special deference paid to state law in Chapter 9 through § 903,
state law might be understood to override the power to reject
under § 365.191 Nonetheless, the apparent freedom to rework
pending collective bargaining agreements is one of the principal
advyantages to proceeding under Chapter 9.192 Although there is no
reason to believe Congress so intended (other than the bare result),
it might be justified on the ground that employee unions, which
constitute a significant political interest group in any city, have
greater influence with "management" in the municipal than in the
private context, and the nonapplicability of § 1113 serves as a
counterweight.
III. THE GOALS OF MUNICIPAL INSOLVENCY LAW
We have worked our way from the beginnings of debt collec-
tion law for municipalities, through the difficult start of our system
of federal municipal bankruptcy, up to the current Chapter 9. In
this Section, we consider more generally the appropriate role of a
municipal insolvency statute.
We start by considering the more familar justifications for in-
solvency laws for natural persons and for artificial persons other
than municipalities. In each case, we can describe a straightfor-
ward principle behind these laws. For natural persons, it is the
idea of the fresh start. Individuals who are hopelessly insolvent
will not have a stake in their futures. Their efforts will redound
almost exclusively to the benefit of their creditors. They will make
inefficient investment decisions, as they will be tempted to adopt
high-variance projects in a desperate attempt to restore solvency.
We could allow individuals to remain in this limbo, having little or
no hope for ever extricating themselves from their financial messes.
This presumably would have a salutary deterrent effect-assuming
that at least some individuals take bankruptcy rules into account
when they make decisions. But we have chosen a different path.
Perhaps we have run the numbers and have concluded that the
losses from a tough policy are exceeded by the gains from a softer
191 See Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisted: A Proposal for Negotiated Modification of
Public Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
37 Hastings L J 231, 330-:31 (1985). See also N6te; Municipal Bankruptdy: Will Lab& be
Forced to Take 'the Proverbial Haircut., 26 Ga'L Rev 959, 973 (1992).
192 Indeed, this was one of the principal reasons that Bridgeport filed fo b kiiptcy.
Bridgeport, 129 Bankr at 339. -t
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approach. Perhaps we believe that individuals do a poor job of
making decisions about low-probability events such as bankruptcy,
and that these cognitive biases require corrective action by the
government. 19 8 Whatever the reason, we discharge the debts of the
individual, allow him to keep some assets, and permit him to start
afresh. 194
We proceed differently for the failed corporation, partnership,
or other state-authorized business entity. We attach no special
value to any particular corporate charter, because for a minimal
filing fee the state will willingly create a new corporation. We need
not worry about discouraging a given corporation from going for-
ward, as the participants in the corporation can home brew a fresh
start by incorporating anew. The same is true for partnerships,
trusts, and other standard business entities.
Instead, for these entities, our bankruptcy laws should be de-
voted-and sometimes probably even are devoted-to ensuring
that the troubled firm's assets are put to their highest and best
use. Sometimes that means liquidating the firm by putting its as-
sets on the auction block. Other times, it may mean downsizing the
firm to leave a profitable core. In either case, society as a whole
benefits when assets are moved from the failing firm into more effi-
cient uses. Most often when a firm fails, we have learned that the
particular combination of physical capital and human capital that
the firm represents is a poor match, one that should be reworked.
This, of course, is not always true: a bad capital structure will be
too much for even an efficient combination of assets, as evidenced
by the failed LBOs of the 1980s. But that fact does not change the
essential point that bankruptcy should help the failed business
firm determine whether the current asset configuration needs to be
reworked.
Our bankruptcy laws thus have two central ideas: fresh starts
for individuals and a life-and-death decision for the business firm's
current mix of assets. Now we come to the municipality: What is
the goal of the municipal bankruptcy laws? Although cities are le-
gally classified as municipal corporations, the purposes of federal
municipal bankruptcy laws resemble individual bankruptcy more
,93 See Jackson, Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 232-41 (cited in note 39).
I" This obviously overstates in that it ignores the entire subject of nondischargeable
debts, see 11 USC § 523, and the power of the court to deny discharge entirely. See 11 USC
§ 727; Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v Tveten, 848 F2d 871, 873-76 (8th Cir 1988); In
Matter of Bowyer, 916 F2d 1056, 1059-60 (5th Cir 1990), affirmed in reh'g, 932 F2d 1100
(1991).
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than corporate bankruptcy: municipal bankruptcy is based on the
idea of the fresh start rather than the efficient reconfiguration of
assets. The theory of Chapter 9 is that the burden of debt service,
if sufficiently high, will affect the taxpayers of a city as it would a
debt-ridden individual: it will sap initiative and depress money-
generating activity. The debt-ridden individual will cease to work
if all the gains go to the creditor; the taxpayers of a city will cease
to pay taxes if rates are too high and the citizens get none of the
benefit. In both contexts, bankruptcy is premised on the idea that
the debtor will become more productive if freed from the burden
of debt, but the law presumes that the debtor will survive bank-
ruptcy in essentially the same form that it went in. We do not dis-
member individuals the way we do private corporations that file
for bankruptcy-that is hardly surprising-but what may be sur-
prising is that we do not dismember municipal corporations either.
Would it not be possible to construct a municipal bankruptcy
regime with the goal of forcing more efficient forms of municipal
organization? In the case of business corporations, we readily rec-
ognize that the entity's size and scope of operations can be
changed, and even that the corporation can be liquidated alto-
gether. Is it not equally true that a municipal corporation's size
and scope of operations could be changed? And that bankruptcy
signals the need for fundamental reform of the city's structure and
affairs?
Under the present municipal bankruptcy regime, bankruptcy
serves no such function. Indeed, it serves little function at all. Be-
tween 1938 and 1972, 362 municipal bankruptcy cases were filed.195
Of that number, 343, or nearly ninety-five percent of the total,
were filed before 1952.196 From 1972 through the end of 1991, there
were an additional ninety Chapter 9 filings, for a total of 452 filings
as of that date over the entire history of the statute.19 If we focus
on general municipalities (excluding special purpose districts,
which are the large majority of insolvent municipal debtors), the
number of cases is even smaller. There were only three Chapter 9
filings by general municipalities between 1972 and 1984, and none
of these was related to the long-term financial health of the city.
These are Chapter 9's Texacos, Manvilles and A.H. Robins. A
youth jumps off of a municipal pier in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi,
'" George H. Hempel, An Evaluation of Municipal "Bankruptcy" Laws and Proce-
dures, 28 J Fin 1339, 1342 (1973).
196 Id.
1' Municipal Bankruptcy Risk, Global Guaranty 1 (Dec 16, 1991).
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and breaks his neck. The city suffers a $370,000 judgment and files
under Chapter 9 to prevent garnishment of its bank accounts.198 A
South Tucson, Arizona police officer shoots and paralyzes a fellow
officer during an incident. The injured officer wins a $3.6 million
judgment against the city. Eventually this city too files under
Chapter 9.1 e In Wapanucka, Oklahoma, a complicated chain of
events spells disaster: an oil tanker crashes and thereby fouls the
town's water supply. A lawsuit is commenced to recover, but in the
meantime, the town needs water-the town condemns a local well,
expecting to pay a modest $5,000, but a court instead awards
$112,000. The town files under Chapter 9 to gain time to prevent
execution of the condemnation award while pursuing its lawsuit
against the oil company. 00 More bankruptcies of this sort may be
expected, given the potential liability municipalities face under
CERCLA.20 1 But these instances do not signal any need for corpo-
rate reorganization.
More to the point is the abortive bankruptcy attempt of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, an unfortunately not atypical city with a
declining tax base, an impoverished citizenry, multiplying needs
and chronically insufficient revenue. Bridgeport was not permitted
to file for bankruptcy, essentially because it was still able to live off
credit, but the end is in sight. Bridgeport and countless cities like
it appear to be in grave need of reorganization. Can bankruptcy
law help? More specifically, if we abandon our presupposition that
municipal corporate structures and boundaries are inviolable and
that the process of bankruptcy should not be allowed to affect the
"political" decisions of city managers, would a more efficient mu-
nicipal structure emerge? As will become evident, this inquiry re-
quires us to confront the most basic issue of municipal government
law: what are cities for? This Section will explore the possibility of
alternative municipal bankruptcy regimes.0
100 See ACIR, Bankruptcies (1985) at 8, 10 (cited in note 158).
199 Id at 11.
'00 Id at 10-11.
"01 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 USC §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp 1991).
202 This section is concerned solely with general purpose municipalities. Most municipal
bankruptcies involve special purpose districts rather than general purpose municipalities,
but special districts more closely resemble ordinary corporations and present less interesting
problems for municipal bankruptcy.
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A. Expanding the Powers of the Bankruptcy Court
Current municipal bankruptcy law strictly limits the pow-
ers-hence the utility-of the bankruptcy court. Chapter 9 ex-
pressly prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with the
"political or governmental powers of the debtor." As discussed
above, this perpetuates the old common law doctrine that forbade
the courts from ordering cities to reduce expenditures and thus
gave current spending decisions absolute priority over past debts,
as well as the doctrine protecting all public property-or at least
that devoted to a "public use," which is almost all public prop-
erty-from attachment and seizure. Presumably, it also precludes
the bankrupcy court from exercising the principal common law ju-
dicial remedy for nonpayment of debts-the order to raise taxes.
All these involve "political or governmental powers" and are
outside the authority of the Chapter 9 court, at least in theory.
But there would be significant advantages to relaxing these
constraints. In most cases, 0 3 chronic financial difficulty is a sign
that ordinary political processes are not functioning properly.
Bankruptcy could be used to force politically unpopular, but sensi-
ble, decisions such as elimination of municipal functions, privatiza-
tion, and changes in tax law. Chapter 9, as drafted, attempts to
prevent the bankruptcy courts from performing any such function.
But to continue past practices may guarantee continued financial
distress in the future. For example, it was widely thought that a
principal reason why Cleveland was in such serious financial diffi-
culties in the mid-1970s was its inefficient and uneconomic opera-
tion of a municipal power company. Similarly, an outsized city
payroll and generous public services (such as free tuition at City
University of New York) were among New York City's major fi-
nancial problems. 0 5 Merely to give the city a fresh start, but not to
address the fundamental causes of its financial problems, may be
no favor. To be sure, bankruptcy would displace democratic deci-
sionmaking. But if democratic decisionmaking has proven incapa-
203 Exceptions are the tort-driven bankruptcies discussed above at text accompanying
notes 198-201. Moreover, in some instances, the fault lies not with the political deci-
sionmakers, but with the political boundaries, an issue we explore below.
20, See, for example, City Defaults on Notes, Facts on File World News Digest at 1008
G1 (Dec 31, 1978).
101 See David Alpern, et al, New York's Last Gasp?, Newsweek 18 (Aug 4, 1975). For an
examination of New York City's current budgetary woes, see Edwin S. Rubenstein, A Citi-
zen's Guide to City Government, City J 26 (Spring 1993).
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ble of making ends meet, that could be viewed as an advantage of
bankruptcy-not something to be avoided.
Receivers appointed undei state law have had notable success
in disciplining municipal budgets and restoring financially dis-
tressed cities to solvency. Ecorse, Michigan, for example, went into
court-ordered receivership in December, 1986, after years of unbal-
anced budgets and an accumulation of $6 million in unpaid debts.
Ecorse, a city of 12,000 downriver of Detroit, was a prosperous in-
dustrial center in the 1950s, but had lost almost all of its industry
and forty percent of its population by the mid-1980s. The receiver
privatized most municipal services (including snow removal, tree
trimming, debris removal, weed cutting, street sweeping, water and
sewer maintenance, and street, alley, and sidewalk repairs), closed
underused facilities (including libraries and an ice rink), cut the
payroll, and sold the building and equipment of the Department of
Public Works. In just three years he halved the annual budget,
eliminated the deficit, and paid off all but $1 million of the debt.206
It was not an exercise in democracy-but ordinary political
processes had failed to do what was necessary.
Better known (though perhaps less successful in the long run)
was the rescue of New York City from default in 1976-1977, largely
through transferral of fiscal authority to a state-appointed Emer-
gency Financial Control Board with power to set city expenditure
levels, contracts, and budget.07 Pennsylvania has an extensive
state scheme for financially-distressed municipalities.0 8 Scranton,
Pennsylvania's fifth largest city, with a population of 81,000, in-
voked the protection of this act in 1991.209 In 1991, Chelsea, Mas-
sachusetts, a city of 28,000, was put into receivership pursuant to
special state legislation.2 0 In other cases, special state oversight
'" Ted Hampton, Receivership Can Be Powerful Tool for Righting Fiscal Wrongs,
Former Ecorse, Mich., Czar Says, The Bond Buyer 28 (Feb 7, 1992); Larry Green, Michigan
Bond Expert Assumes Task; City Takes Debt Medicine: Loses Its Power to Govern, LA
Times A12 (Jun 24, 1989); Greg Kaza, A Town Gets Rid of Its Deficit-And Most of Its
Government, Newsday 87 (Dec 15, 1989).
M01 For a description of state efforts to avert default, see Flushing National Bank v
Municipal Assistance Corp., 358 NE2d 848, 859-60, 40 NY2d 731 (1976) (Cooke dissenting).
See also Alpern, et al, Newsweek 18 (cited in note 205); Donna E. Shalala and Carol Bel-
Iamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 Duke L J 1119.
20o Financially Distressed Municipalities Act, 53 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 11701.101 et seq.
See Emmet, Fiscal Distress (cited in note 168), for a review of the law.
209 See Michael deCourcy Hinds, A Campaign to Pull Scranton Back from Disaster,
NY Times A12 (Jul 21, 1992), for a description of the Scranton experience.
1110 See Powers v Secretary of Administration, 412 Mass 119, 587 NE2d 744, 745 (1992).
See also Brian McGrory, Carlin Leaves a Solvent Chelsea, but More Tasks Remain, Boston
Globe 20 (Jul 31, 1992).
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boards are created to oversee a municipality's finances. Operating
power remains with elected officials. Three cities in Massachu-
setts-Brockton, Lawrence, and Lowell-are currently operating in
this manner.211
Federal bankruptcy courts have been explicitly denied any
such powers. But in practice, the bankruptcy court may have more
authority than at first appears. To be sure, the court may not order
reductions in expenditure, sale of property, renegotiation of con-
tracts, or increase in taxes. But the court can refuse to accept the
city's debt adjustment plan on the ground that it is not in the
"best interests of the creditors." This provision could be inter-
preted to mean that the city is capable of taking steps that would
be more advantageous to the creditors than defaulting,212 and in
most instances this probably means cutting spending, selling prop-
erty, or raising taxes. Either of the first two interpretations would
represent a stretch-at least as measured by the cases cited in the
relevant legislative history2 - but ordering the levy of previously
authorized taxes would not. That might be a sufficient club to lead
to judicial control by a wink and a nod, as the city determines
what it must do-"voluntarily"-in order to induce the court to
accept a plan of adjustment.
There is precedent for this kind of judicial activity under
Chapter 11, under which the bankruptcy court is barred from mod-
ifying a plan. In practice, this means that the creditors must deter-
mine the judge's objections to a proposed plan and alter it accord-
ingly. The effect may be to alter the balance of power somewhat,
but probably not to affect the bottom line to any substantial de-
gree. In much the same way, even under Chapter 9 an aggressive
court could presumably insist upon various steps involving the
"political or governmental powers of the debtor" as the price of
approval of a plan. Thus, the bankruptcy court's authority could
be greater than it seems.
There are, however, three reasons to believe current bank-
ruptcy powers are inadequate under this vision of the purposes of
bankruptcy. First, the "best interests of the creditors" standard
might not be intended to give the court such broad discretion to
second-guess the city's financial arrangements. As discussed above,
"best interest of the creditors" was borrowed from private bank-
211 See Michael Grunwald, Renewal of Fiscal Board is Weighed; Progress 6y Brockton
is Noted, Boston Globe 1 (Mar 14, 1993).
212 For more complete discussion of this provision, see Section ll.B.3.
213 See text accompanying notes 178-86.
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ruptcy law, where it means, roughly, that creditors should not be
worse off in bankruptcy than they would be out of bankruptcy.
The legislative history pointed to two cases in which the courts
explored whether tax levels were sufficient-which is consistent
with the general standard, since the mandamus to raise taxes was
the creditors' principal remedy outside of bankruptcy. The ques-
tion is whether this concept could be broadened to encompass
other municipal financial measures that could improve the credi-
tors' chances of payment, but that are beyond the judicial power
under the common law.
Second, even if the bankruptcy court has authority to engage
in this kind of decisionmaking, implementation of the "deal"
would require action by the city's political leadership. If, for exam-
ple, the court agreed to accept the city's proposed plan of adjust-
ment only if it privatized a costly city-owned utility, it would then
be necessary for the city council to approve the privatization
scheme. Since the political leadership had not been able to take
such steps on its own, it is doubtful that it would do so now.2 1
Thus, even if a rational city administration would agree to the
court's proposals, the same failed administration that created the
financial crisis would likely fail to agree to the steps to solve it.
The only hope is that the politicians could shift the "blame" to the
court, and thus break the political log jam. Failing this, however,
coercive authority is likely to be necessary.
Third, even if the .bankruptcy court has the requisite authority
and the political process is fully rational and cooperative, it may be
that the city lacks the legal authority to make all the reforms that
may be necessary. Thus, one way to use bankruptcy more con-
structively would be for Congress to expand the powers of the
court to enable it to order politically unpopular reforms. This
would require not only a radical revision in the theory of Chapter
9, but also reconsideration of some of the basic common law princi-
ples of municipal debt collection.
Of the six creditors' remedies discussed in Section I, four
should be permitted to the bankruptcy court. First, the power to
order the levying and collection of taxes authorized at the time of
214 Often, municipal financial crisis is accompanied by political paralysis. See, for exam-
ple, Bill Peterson, Cleveland: City Where Politics Has Failed, Wash Post A3 (Dec 28, 1978)
("This is a city where politics has failed, where the normal give-and-take of compromise has
turned into a theater of the absurd."); Alpern, et al, Newsweek 18 (cited in note 205)
("There was no question that New York's problems were largely due to the expansiveness,
ineptitude and plain irresponsibility of its leaders.").
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the creation of a consensual debt-the recognized mandamus rem-
edy-should be vested in the bankruptcy court, so that a single
tribunal can deal with the entire range of issues arising from the
municipal debt structure. This would merely make explicit through
the statute that the bankruptcy court can exercise the authority
over state and local taxes that federal courts traditionally have ex-
ercised outside of bankruptcy. A bankruptcy court might also be
empowered to increase taxes even without a prior state authoriza-
tion, but this would likely be held unconstitutional, and should
be.215 Second, in derogation of common law doctrine, the bank-
ruptcy court should be able to order reductions in wasteful ex-
penditures as a condition for debt relief. The absolute priority of
current spending decisions over debt repayment is part of the
problem, and removing it would be part of the solution. This
power would parallel that given to state receivers for municipalities
under applicable state law. And third, the ability to attach particu-
lar streams of income for the repayment of bonds-subject, of
course, to prior pledges of these revenue streams-can enable the
city to obtain more favorable terms for refinancing. During New
York's debt crisis, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, the state
agency created for restructing the city's debt, was assigned first
claim to the city's sales and stock transfer taxes and all its per
capita state aid. This undoubtedly enabled the agency to fund the
debt more cheaply, and thus to resolve the financial crisis at lower
cost.
Perhaps more importantly, the court should be empowered to
sell municipal property in appropriate instances. Allowing a city to
keep all of its assets while being discharged of its debts is the prin-
cipal source of the moral hazard problem in municipal bankruptcy.
There are persuasive reasons to protect true public trust prop-
erty-for example, streets and alleys, central parks, and beaches.
215 The concurring opinion in Missouri v Jenkins carefully distinguished those cases in
which mandamus was issued to enforce preexisting taxing authority from cases such as
United States v County of Macon, 99 US 582, 590-91 (1879), in which no preexisting au-
thority existed. 495 US at 71-71 (Kennedy concurring). The majority opinion held otherwise
for the purpose of remedying desegregation, see Jenkins, 495 US at 56-57, but probably did
not reach the issue for general tax increases to pay debts. The majority cited only Van
Hoffman v City of Quincy, 71 US 535 (1866), in which the Court issued mandamus based on
the taxing authority that existed at the time of the issuance of the bonds. The state had
limited that taxing authority after the fact, and the Court found the new limit to contravene
the Contracts Clause. 71 US at 554-55, cited in Jenkins, 495 US at 56-57. Van Hoffman
therefore is just a straightforward application of the Contracts Clause, and no more. The
Jenkins majority opinion is an unpersuasive reading of both precedent and principle, and is
probably explicable only on the basis of its particular political context.
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Such property is not merely devoted to a public use (an expansive
concept) but has properly been deemed inalienable under common
law.21 6 Public trust property is property used to provide a genuine
public good; social welfare would be diminished if it passed into
private hands. To put the point in economic terms: any property
that generates positive externalities that cannot be captured by the
owner and that exceed the private value of the land should be left
in public control. In addition, there may be other municipal prop-
erty-not within the traditional boundaries of "public trust" prop-
erty-whose value in city hands so far exceeds its value to private
purchasers that its seizure and sale should be barred. But there is
no persuasive reason to deny the bankruptcy court the power to
require the city to sell other valuable property, such as land ac-
quired for nonpayment of taxes, ordinary equipment or office
space, municipally-owned profit-making businesses, or bank ac-
counts.217 Indeed, one of the most important strategies for restor-
ing fiscal health is the privatization of previously governmental
services. This can both generate cash and reduce operating ineffi-
ciencies and subsidies. But it cannot be done through bankruptcy
if all governmental property is exempt from sale. Thus, by narrow-
ing the gap between the rights of municipal and private creditors,
the bankruptcy court could be enabled to provide genuine and
needed fiscal discipline, rather than just to discharge the debts and
return the city to its former ways.
Moreover, if filing for bankruptcy entailed a grant of jurisdic-
tion to the court over basic spending, taxing, and property deci-
sions, it would no longer be necessary to have restrictive gate-
keeper provisions, like the insolvency requirement, that delay
bankruptcy to the detriment of both creditor and debtor. 18 Those
restrictions are a response to the moral hazard of easy debt relief,
coupled with the insulation of municipal property from seizure and
sale. If the powers of the bankruptcy court were expanded as sug-
gested, there is little danger that political leaders would file precip-
itously, or that they would behave irresponsibly beforehand in reli-
ance on easy debt relief. By making the consequences of
116 See Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois, 146 US 387, 452-62 (1892); Richard A. Ep-
stein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J 411 (1987).
217 To stave off default, the City of Cleveland sold off its parks, zoo, sewer and transit
systems, and stadium operations. Peterson, Wash Post at A3 (cited in note 214).
11 See text accompanying notes 134-39. Similarly, the "good faith" requirement would
have little significance.
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bankruptcy for the city more severe, it becomes possible to make it
more readily available to distressed municipalities.2 19
If bankruptcy courts were converted into an instrument of
long-term reform of municipal finances along lines more similar to
private bankruptcy, the question arises whether-as in private
bankruptcy-creditors should be permitted to file a petition and
force the debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. If the city's fiscal
troubles are caused, in part, by irresponsible political management,
then creditors could perform a useful function as monitors and in-
stigators of outside intervention. On the other hand, involuntary
bankruptcy would pose serious constitutional difficulties.
Under a system of expanded bankruptcy powers, even volun-
tary bankruptcy-that is, a regime in which the city has the right,
but not the obligation, to petition for bankruptcy-would allow the
federal court to trench deeply into the internal political processes
of state and local governments, and thus may be unconstitutional.
These problems might be solved simply by retaining the feature of
present law allowing states to choose whether to allow their munic-
ipalities to file for bankruptcy. But this is not obvious. States may
not be able to waive fundamental aspects of their own autonomy.
The precise extent of federalism protection under the Constitution
today is in doubt, but a good argument can be made that for a
federal bankruptcy court to assume municipal powers of taxation,
property disposition, and spending-even with state authoriza-
tion-would be going too far.2 2
Involuntary bankruptcy would be even more problematic. If
the state required the city to file (either by general legislation or
case-specific order) the constitutional situation would be no differ-
ent, from the point of view of federalism, than if the city chose to
file. But if the state left the matter to municipal discretion, under
219 Allowing sales of municipal property inside of bankruptcy but not outside of bank-
ruptcy might be thought to create a forum-shopping problem: distressed situations which
might be worked out outside of bankruptcy will now be filed to gain access to the new sale
power. So long as the current bar against involuntary filings is maintained, this should not
pose a substantial problem. Creditors cannot move the case into bankruptcy directly, and,
given the inability to seize assets outside of bankruptcy, they probably cannot coerce a fil-
ing. The city itself, of course, can sell outside of bankruptcy and so would not need to file to
be able to sell assets.
220 If we assume that it would violate the Constitution for the federal courts to assume
these powers coercively, then it might well be a violation, under the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine, for the federal courts to withhold the substantial benefit of allowing debt
adjustment unless the states and cities waived their constitutional rights in this regard. See
generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987-Foreword: Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988); Kathleen Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1415 (1989).
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home rule power or otherwise, involuntary bankruptcy could take
place without either level of government affirmatively sanctioning
it. It would be a raw exercise of federal power-in effect, refusing
to give effect to the state's decision to leave the bankruptcy deci-
sion in the hands of the city.221
It may well be, therefore, that federal municipal bankruptcy
law is even more fundamentally misconceived than at first ap-
peared: there shouldn't be any. If we need municipal bankruptcy
courts with far-reaching powers, but such courts would be inconsis-
tent with our federal system, it follows that states and not Con-
gress should establish them. Indeed, many states-like Ecorse's
Michigan-have done just that. An additional reason to favor state
bankruptcy law is that state resources could be employed as part
of the package. Under many state plans, for example, the state will
lend its credit to a distressed municipality-provided the city
agrees to specified fiscal reforms-thus enabling the city to refi-
nance its outstanding obligations at a far lower interest rate. States
also have the power to make changes in municipal governance or
municipal boundaries that may be a useful part of reorganization.
Under the current system, in which federal bankruptcy is an alter-
native to state reform rather than supplemental to it,22 2 no one is
in a position to coordinate state assistance to federal debt adjust-
ment. We therefore recommend that the states be empowered to
displace federal municipal bankruptcy law with state municipal
bankruptcy law.
Does this proposal return to the other horn of the old consti-
tutional dilemma: that the Contracts Clause prohibits states from
passing effective bankruptcy laws? We think not. First, the Su-
preme Court rejected that argument in Faitoute,225 which appears
21 Since the municipal bankruptcy statute applies specifically to cities and not to pri-
vate entities, it is subject to judicial scrutiny under New York v United States, 112 S Ct
2408 (1992), rather than Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528
(1985). Under traditional principles, the "number, nature and duration of the powers con-
ferred upon [municipal corporations] rests in the absolute discretion of the State." Hunter v
City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 178 (1907). To allow involuntary bankruptcy in the absence
of affirmative state authorization would effectively prohibit states from delegating this deci-
sion to their cities, and thus run afoul of Hunter. It might be argued that this is permissible
under Lawrence County v Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469 US 256 (1985) (up-
holding federal statute requiring states to delegate discretion over spending certain federal
monies to the municipalities that receive them), but this case, even if correctly decided,
rests upon the view that Congress has authority to impose conditions on its expenditure of
funds. Id at 269-70. Such a principle, if extended to other federal powers, would swallow up
federalism principles.
" See text accompanying notes 140-55.
" 316 US at 509-16; see text accompanying notes 122-24.
19931
The University of Chicago Law Review
still to be good law. Faitoute stands for the proposition that the
Contracts Clause is not violated if-as a practical and not a techni-
cal matter-the state substitutes a remedy that is as valuable as
the one that had been contracted for. In effect, the Contracts
Clause allows state municipal bankruptcy laws but constitutional-
izes a "best interest of the creditors" test,224 preventing the states
from adopting debt adjustment programs that benefit the munici-
pal debtor at the expense of the creditors.2 2
Second, in Faitoute, New Jersey added the state insolvency
legislation after the bonds had been created and it was that fea-
ture which raised an impairment problem. The Contracts Clause
itself does not bar a before-the-fact state insolvency scheme, as it
would be incorporated into the contract.226
Third, even if it were true that the Contracts Clause bars any
state from imposing involuntary debt adjustments, there is no rea-
son Congress could not substitute for Chapter 9 framework legisla-
tion that uses the federal power to abrogate contracts solely as an
adjunct to state-ordered plans under state law. The only legal bar,
ironically, is the Bankruptcy Code itself, which prevents states
from ordering debt adjustment plans,227 undoing the states' victory
in Faitoute. It seems to us that the reverse is more desirable: state
bankruptcy law is both more consistent with our constitutional
structure and more likely to be effective on the merits than federal
bankruptcy law.
One might object that states would choose not to enact ade-
quate municipal bankruptcy laws. That is always a risk when deci-
sions are decentralized. But states have a strong incentive
(stronger than the federal government) to protect and strengthen
the financial stability of their cities. A municipal default of one
city will have a serious impact on the rest of the state. We have no
reason to believe that states would be recalcitrant. The lack of
state municipal bankruptcy laws prior to the federal act does not
224 See id at 514 (describing the state debt adjustment statute as being "for the protec-
tion not only of their credit [i.e., the credit of the municipalities] but of all the creditors").
225 In addition to Faitoute, see United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1, 28
(1977). A more difficult question is how to reconcile state municipal bankruptcy relief with
state constitutional requirements of full faith and credit. Such a requirement proved to be
an impediment to the program to avert default by New York City in 1976. See Flushing
National Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp., 358 NE2d 848, 40 NY2d 731 (1976).
226 Ogden v Saunders, 25 US (12 wheat) 213 (1827).
117 See 11 USC § 903.
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prove that states were unwilling, but only that they were then
thought to be barred by the Contracts Clause.22
B. Dissolution of the Municipal Corporation
The previous discussion assumes that the city will survive
bankruptcy, albeit in altered form. But to press more rigorously
the analogy to private bankruptcy, we must ask whether the very
corporate structure-the independent existence-of the bankrupt
city should be reconsidered. Cities may appear fixed and perma-
nent, but they are purely a creation of law and thus subject to legal
revision. Indeed, the physical boundaries of municipal entities
change with surprising frequency. In the ten-year span from 1970-
1979, there were 61,356 annexations to municipalities and 1,026 de-
tachments. 229 As these figures indicate, cities often expand and,
less frequently, cities divide.
Municipal corporations can also be liquidated. Unlike a state
or (in most state constitutional systems) a county, a city or a spe-
cial district can cease to exist, and the territory can be governed as
an unincorporated part of the county. Between 1942 and 1972, the
number of governmental units declined by nearly half, many of
them through merger with other units of government but some
through simple disincorporation.230 Between 1960 and 1970, 184
218 It would also be possible (though not necessarily desirable) to retain a federal sys-
tem for cities in states that have not adopted a state system.
1 9 See US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Boundary and Annexation Sur-
vey, 1970-79 2 (GPO, 1980).
230 The biggest single source of decline relates to the dramatic drop in the number of
school districts from 108,579 in 1942 to just 15,781 in 1972. There has been a steady decline
in the number of townships and towns, though if you instead focus on the total number of
municipalities, townships and towns, there is a one-time drop from 35,139 in 1942 to 34,009
i 1952, with a steady rise thereafter. The following chart sumarizes the evidence:
Type of Government 1942 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987
Total 155,116 116,807 102,392 91,237 81,299 78,269 79,913 81,831 83,237
U.S. Government 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
State Government 48 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Local Government 155,067 116,756 102,341 91,186 81,248 78,218 79,862 81,780 83,186
County 3,050 3,052 3,050 3,043 3,049 3,044 3,042 3,041 3,042
Municipal 16,220 16,807 17,215 18,000 18,048 18,517 18,862 19,076 19,200
Township & Town 18,919 17,202 17,198 17,142 17,105 16,991 16,822 16,734 16,691
School District 108,579 67,355 50,454 34,678 21,782 15,781 15,174 14,851 14,721
Special District 8,299 12,340 14,424 18,323 21,264 23,885 25,962 28,078 29,532
Adjusted to include units in Alaska and Hawaii which adopted statehood in 1959.
US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990 272 (GPO,
110th ed 1990).
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municipalities, mostly rural communities, disincorporated. 23 ' To be
sure, many of these were little will-o'-the-wisp towns of a dozen or
so folks, but these towns didn't start that way, and for them, dis-
incorporation represents the end of an often long decline.23 2 Others
were areas that decided to try local general government, only to
conclude very quickly that prior arrangements served them bet-
ter.233 Still others were shut by disasters, natural or man-made.3 4
Cities, as legal entities, are not a necessary feature of the land-
scape; they are optional. A map of the Chicago metropolitan area
shows much unincorporated territory. Iowa has one unincorporated
town for every four incorporated towns. '3 5 In other states, unincor-
porated towns have populations numbering in the tens of
thousands.236 There is no legal reason why a municipal corporation
cannot simply liquidate and cease to exist.
In the private context, bankruptcy serves to induce corporate
reorganizations-of size, scope, and even of existence-to produce
more efficient configurations. 23 7 That an entity files for bankruptcy
is prima facie evidence (though not dispositive proof) of a defect in
the present corporate design. Perhaps the same could be said of
municipal bankruptcy. As Richard Briffault has observed, "there
may be no neutral, 'scientific' answer concerning the optimal struc-
231 Bill Richards, The Two Faces of the American Heartland, Wash Post Al (Dec 21,
1977) (citing figures compiled by Stanley V. Voelker of the US Agriculture Department's
Economic Research Service).
232 Tiny Town Wipes Itself Off the Map, Wash Times B8 (Jan 9, 1991) (describing 6-1
vote in favor of disincorporating by town of Donnon, Iowa); UPI, (untitled item) (Dec 29,
1983) (available in LEXIS NEXISIUPSTAT database) (describing 20-0 vote in favor of dis-
incorporating by city of Yost, Utah).
'"Pine Valley, New York incorporated in March, 1988, and voted to disincorporate
barely two years later. See Steve Wick, Auditors Criticize Village, Newsday 20 (Apr 19,
1990). Liberty City, Texas incorporated and disincorporated within the space of three years.
UPI (untitled item) (Apr 9, 1982) (available in LEXIS NEXIS/UPSTAT database).
2 Times Beach, Missouri, best known as the site of a major dioxin contamination,
disincorporated in early 1985. The town's population had dwindled from 2,242 prior to
knowledge of the disaster to 2. See By Governor's Order, Times Beach is Gone, Chi Trib 3
(Apr 4, 1985).
222 After the disincorporation of Plain View, Iowa, the number of incorporated Iowa
towns was 955, but according to the Iowa League of Muncipalities, there were between 250
and 270 unincoporated towns. UPI (untitled item) (Mar 3, 1987) (available in LEXIS
NEXISIUPSTAT database).
23 For example, the unincorporated area known as Channelview, outside of Houston,
has a population of 17,000, while unincorporated Rio Grande City has a population of about
10,000. UPI (untitled item) (Jul 30, 1985) (available in LEXIS NEXIS/UPSTAT database).
237 At least that is the hope. The academic literature is largely critical of Chapter 11.
See Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
Yale L J 1043 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations,
15 J Legal Stud 127 (1986).
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ture for metropolitan governance: different structures will favor or
harm different interests."2 8 When a municipality cannot make
ends meet, this might indicate that a more fundamental change
needs to be made-something more than just a conventionally un-
derstood fresh start.
When a private corporation is liquidated in bankruptcy, it can
simply cease to exist. Its assets are distributed, and there is noth-
ing left to it. The same might be true of many special districts,
which make up the vast majority of municipal bankruptcies.2 9
Liquidation of a general municipal corporation, however, is more
complicated. Cities exercise a portion of the state's police power
and perform certain essential services, neither of which can simply
cease. Moreover, cities own property that may constitute a quintes-
sential public good, and which should not be allowed to devolve
into private hands. We must therefore consider: if a city is dis-
solved, what becomes of its residual powers and obligations?
The answer to that question depends on one's theory of the
nature of municipal government. There are two principal theo-
ries.240 Under one, associated with the great treatise writer and
Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Dillon, cities are nothing more
than instrumentalities of the state, created by the state for the
more effective implementation of state policies. It would seem to
follow, under this theory, that if the municipal corporation is dis-
solved, its powers and obligations revert to their source, the state,
or perhaps to a parallel or intermediate level of government desig-
nated by the state, such as a neighboring jurisdiction or the
county. The competing theory, associated with Michigan Supreme
Court Justice and constitutional treatise writer Thomas Cooley,
holds that cities are the creations of their citizens, for their own
purposes, exercising a fundamental right of self-government.
Under this theory, it would seem to follow that if the municipal
corporation is dissolved, the citizens are free to exercise their pri-
mordial right to form others, which would exercise like powers and
be subject to like obligations. As we shall see, these two views have
very different implications for liquidation in bankruptcy.
2" Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination,
92 Colum L Rev 775, 779 (1992) (footnote omitted).
23 See text accompanying notes 193-202.
210 For a useful summary of the two theories, see Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional
Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American
Law, 1986 Wis L Rev 83, 88-100, 137-49.
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C. Merger and Consolidation
The Supreme Court has long held that our Constitution "looks
to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states. '24 1
Moreover, most states divide the entire territory among counties,
which perform essential services such as the provision of roads,
courts, tax assessment, and sheriffs' departments. While counties
are not indestructible-they may be merged or redivided or their
boundaries redrawn by the state-each square inch of the state at
every moment is part of one and only one county. 42 According to
traditional theory, however, cities and villages, unlike counties or
states, are a quasi-voluntary form of organization, created at the
instigation of the local citizens for the purpose of joint provision of
a wider range of municipal services than are available from the
county or the state. 43
Areas not within a city, town, or other municipal government
are left unincorporated, subject only to the governance of the
county and the state. Unincorporated areas typically get by on
lower taxes and lower services, and the presence of incorporated as
well as unincorporated areas provide citizens in the metropolitan
area a choice of the mix of taxes and services they desire.
241 Texas v White, 74 US (7 Wall) 700, 725 (1868).
242 This is not true of every state. In Virginia, for example, territory within a first class
city is withdrawn from the county, and Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Alaska lack organ-
ized county government (though boroughs perform much the role of counties in inhabited
parts of Alaska). In Louisiana, counties are termed "parishes." Moreover, in some places
(Philadelphia, Indianapolis, San Francisco, and Nashville, for example), city and county
government have merged, while in others (New York, for example), the city is larger than
the counties. In these exceptional circumstances, the framework described in the text would
not apply.
242 See Hamilton County Commissioners v Mighels, 7 Ohio St 109, 118-19 (1857):
[M]unicipal corporations proper are called into existence, either at the direct solicita-
tion or by the free consent of the people who compose them.
Counties are local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign power of the state,
of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent ac-
tion of the people who inhabit them. The former organization is asked for, or at least
asssented to by the people it embraces; the latter is superimposed by a sovereign and
paramount authority.
A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage, and con-
venience of the locality and its people; a county organization is created almost exclu-
sively with a view to the policy of the state at large, for purposes of political organiza-
tion and civil administration, in matters of finance, of education, of provision for the
poor, of military organization, of the means of travel and transport, and especially for
the general administration of justice. With scarcely an exception, all the powers and
functions of the county organization have a direct and exclusive reference to the gen-
eral policy of the state and are, in fact, but a branch of the general administration of
that policy.
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In the event of dissolution, some states might choose to merge
the dissolved city into surrounding jurisdictions. The advantage
would be to broaden the tax base and achieve economies of scale,
though there is some danger that the debt-ridden city would drag
down its stable neighbor. There is precedent for merger in the case
of special districts, and especially school districts,244 and Michigan
legislators considered enactment of a formal mechanism for merg-
ing financially distressed cities in the wake of the Ecorse receiver-
ship. Successful though the receivership was in bringing the budget
under control, the receiver was quoted as stating that "Ecorse
ought to disappear. ' '245
More likely, if the municipal corporation dissolves, governing
responsibility could devolve upon the county. This would have two
effects. First, it would eliminate all municipal services in the for-
merly incorporated part of the county that were above and beyond
those provided in the unincorporated part. This should be a rough
proxy for essential governmental services, at least in theory.246 Sec-
ond, it would shift the costs of providing those essential services
from the citizens of the former city to all the citizens of the county.
Since the new county government will be free to determine its own
level of services (within the constraints of state law), the principal
effect will be to increase the geographical scope of municipal gov-
ernment. Thus, bankruptcy-as-dissolution could lead to a merger
of city and county, usually meaning city and suburbs-the objec-
tive of many a municipal reformer.247 Should the county govern-
ment become insolvent, the state would provide the essential func-
tions of government (since the county, unlike the city, is legally a
subordinate unit of the state, performing the duties of the state,
and not an agency of the local citizens).
'4 The North Chicago school district recently voted to dissolve. Students would shift
over to adjoining school districts, a move opposed by those districts. See Stanley Holmes
and James Hill, New dilemma for schools: Who helps failed districts?, Chi Trib Al (Mar 25,
1993).
245 Green, LA Times A12 (Jun 24, 1989) (cited in note 206).
246 We recognize that the relations between cities and counties have changed signifi-
cantly from the traditional model, and thus that in many states there would be practical
problems with this result. We present it, however, as a thought experimefit rather than a
concrete proposal for reform.
247 See, for example, Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 15-22 (Columbia,
1976); Frank S. Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem (U
Michigan Law School, 1960) (published in the series Legal Research Center, U Michigan
Law School: Legal Problems in Metropolitan Areas); Symposium, Restructuring Metropoli-
tan Area Government, 58 Georgetown L J 663 (1970); Note, The Urban County: a Study of
New Approaches to Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, 73 Harv L Rev 526 (1960).
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This does not necessarily mean that the county would remain
the sole municipal government. The merits of city dissolution must
be understood in the context of the dynamic that arises when the
provision of essential services devolves on the default general mu-
nicipalities-the state and its local agents, the counties-which in
turn will trigger a reconfiguring of public services in the affected
area. The county and the state have an incentive to find some via-
ble form of municipal corporation that will again absorb the costs
of city government in the former city. Only if countywide govern-
ment is more efficient will no new municipal corporation be cre-
ated. Consider a hypothetical Bridgeport, located within a larger
county. If Bridgeport actually becomes insolvent and dissolves, it
would cease to exist and the essential service obligations would de-
volve upon the county and, ultimately, upon the state. If the citi-
zens of the state became responsible for providing essential ser-
vices to Bridgeport, the state would have the incentive to devise a
more efficient new municipal structure to replace the old, the most
likely outcome being some form of metropolitan government.
But if this is the proper disposition of the powers and obliga-
tions of the dissolved city, what is to become of its assets and its
debts? As noted above, the state-and by the same logic the
county-has not been deemed liable for the municipality's debts.
If this rule were changed, states would presumably begin to exer-
cise far more rigorous scrutiny of municipal financial affairs, a re-
sult that presumably would enhance fiscal responsibility but at the
same time cut seriously into local autonomy. Determining the
greater evil is a deeply political judgment, but we understand the
movement in this century toward expanded home rule powers to
be a collective judgment that local autonomy is worth some risk,
and on that basis we assume that states and counties will not be
forced to shoulder the debts of the bankrupt city.
We believe that assets should follow obligations. If the obliga-
tions of the city are inherited by the state or county, the assets
should be inherited as well (subject to the same public trust that
limited the city's ability to sell genuine "public trust" property).
But if the obligations are discharged, non-public trust property
should be sold for the payment of the debt. To the extent that
some of the property has its highest and best use as governmental
property, the county or the state can buy it. But for the same rea-
son we believe that the common law doctrine against foreclosure
on all public property is misguided, the citizens of the city should
not be allowed to discharge their past debts while holding on to
their accumulated assets.
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D. Formation of New Cities
What if we envision cities not as creatures of the state and
part of a hierarchy of governments but as creations of their citi-
zens, for pursuit of their own purposes? It follows, under such a
view, that when any particular municipal corporation is dissolved,
its non-public trust property will be sold and its people returned to
the unincorporated mass from which they came. The people would
then have the same right as any other groups of people living in
unincorporated territory to form cities of their own liking. In short,
the city becomes a voluntary association again, just as it was in the
beginning. Indeed, at this stage, cities are hard to distinguish from
homeowner associations or other voluntary associations of property
owners-the sole important difference being that cities can form
with less than unanimous consent.248
We assume that any new cities so created would, as a practical
matter, have to satisfy state law definitions of a city, includ-
ing-most importantly-the requirement of geographical contigu-
ity.249 But there is nothing inherent in these definitions, and for
heuristic purposes it is useful to abstract from the contiguity re-
quirement, so as to expose the implications of the idea of the city
as a contractual creation in its most radical form. Imagine contrac-
tual cities bound together by agreements of their inhabitants
rather than the caprice of physical proximity-municipal archipel-
agoes. This enables us to dispense (in theory) with the need for
less than unanimous consent, for these municipal archipelagoes
need not include any unwilling citizens within their borders. There
is nothing to prevent different configurations of municipal corpora-
tions for the provision of different services. Indeed (to return to
the real world for a moment) the proliferation of special districts
spanning more than one traditional jurisdiction is precisely this.
The archipelago cities, we assume, can achieve necessary econo-
mies of scale through contractual arrangements among cities and
private service-providers 2 80-and for this thought experiment to
work it is necessary to assume that any problems of negative exter-
nalities can be handled by higher units of government.
"48 See Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1520 (cited in note 18); Advisory Comm'n on
Intergovernmental Relations, Residential Community Associations: Private Governments
in the Intergovernmental System? 1-7 (ACIR, May, 1989).
'29 See Ocean Beach Heights, Inc. v Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 302 US 614, 618-
20 (1938).
"60 See Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 Pub Choice 19, 21 (1969).
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The question we pose is whether contractual cities would be in
the public interest. The answer requires a theory of the city and of
its proper purposes. One purpose of cities is to provide public
goods-any good for which it is impossible to exclude others from
consuming and for which consumption by one person does not de-
grade consumption by another. National defense is the quintessen-
tial public good. 1 Such goods would not be provided, or at least
not in sufficient quantities, if left to private initiative. Moreover,
there is a second class of goods, dubbed by economists "club
goods, '25 2 which have the characteristic that many persons can
consume them simultaneously but after a certain point, there are
negative externalities associated with additional consumers.5 3
Consider a public park on the Fourth of July. The second person
to appear at the park is not barred from using the park because
someone else was there first. This is true of the third person, and
the fourth, etc. Nonetheless, at some point, each additional person
further congests the park, and from the perspective of those al-
ready at the park, the new arrival imposes an additional cost on
them and thereby decreases their enjoyment.
Many of the services associated with local government fall into
this category. Municipal facilities and services such as parks, pools,
forest preserves, museums, lakeside areas and police and fire pro-
tection can be considered club goods. These goods often will be
natural monopolies, because they involve substantial fixed costs
and low marginal costs for most (but not all) of the relevant range
of production. The municipal swimming pool may be uncomforta-
bly crowded on six afternoons during the year, but that does not
mean it would pay to build a second pool. Public ownership is one
2" Though there are doubts about whether even defense qualifies. See Richard Comes
and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods 4 (Cam-
bridge, 1986).
252 This literature originated in James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
Economica 1 (1965). A general introduction to club goods can be found in Comes and San-
dler, Theory of Externalities at 1-25, 157-243 (cited in note 251); David A. Starrett, Foun-
dations of Public Economics 40-62 (Cambridge, 1988). See also Eytan Sheshinski, The Sup-
ply of Communal Goods and Revenue Sharing, in Martin S. Feldstein and Robert P.
Inman, eds, The Economics of Public Services 253 (International Economic Association,
1977); David E. Mills, Ownership Arrangements and Congestion-Prone Facilities, 71 Amer
Econ Rev 493 (1981).
283 In some sense, club goods are the flipside of goods exhibiting network externalities.
For those goods, adding an additional consumer to the network increases the return to the
preexisting consumer base. See Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Com-
patability, and Innovation, 16 Rand J Econ 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Amer Econ Rev 424 (1985).
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way to overcome the natural monopoly problem if regulation would
be too cumbersome, or if it is difficult to exclude non-payers.2 "
The central idea of the club is that the owners of the means of
production and the consumers of the production are identical. The
producers therefore "internalize" precisely the preferences of the
consumers. For private goods, there is almost always separation be-
tween consumption and ownership of the means of production. In
competitive markets, this is irrelevant, as competitive forces effec-
tively equate private profit maximization by producers with inter-
nalization by producers of consumer preferences. 55 In contrast, in
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, the separation of ownership
and consumption becomes a problem. Producers will internalize
consumer preferences only partially. For example, a monopolist
might very well engage in two-part pricing or might offer a com-
plex peak-load pricing schedule to adjust for congestion effects.
Nonetheless, a moncpolist constrained to offering the same sched-
ule to each consumer, regardless of how complex that schedule is,
will ultimately set prices in such a way that ignores the fact that
some consumers are excluded from the good even if their value for
it exceeds the marginal cost of producing it. In contrast, if the
identical means of production were owned by the consum-
ers-owned by a club-production decisions would more perfectly
reflect consumer desire.2 56
The idea is that public ownership results in a closer tracking
of consumer desire than would ownership by a private monopolist.
This puts the city in the business of providing local public and
club goods. Nonetheless, the full extent to which it can do so is far
from unlimited and depends on a number of factors. As Charles
Tiebout emphasized in his foundational work,5 7 individuals can
move from place to place. The fact that a citizen can vote with his
feet limits the extent to which disaffected citizens can be forced to
share services with others. Furthermore, citizens in a given location
may substitute private for public services. These two facts substan-
254 Club goods also include private goods-meaning goods consumed by only one person
or household-which have decreasing average costs over the relevant region. These too are
local natural monopolies, and the same benefits of lining up producer interests and con-
sumer interests may be obtained through club--or in this case, public--ownership.
255 See Comes and Sandler, Theory of Externalities at 188 (cited in note 251).
1 The constraint to a single price schedule may matter. It is quite possible to imagine
that a club would have an anti-price discrimination norm--everyone pays the same price for
the same access-while a monopolist's only "norm" is maximizing profits, which would per-
mit price disrimination if it was implementable at an acceptable price.
257 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416
(1956).
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review
tially circumscribe the manner in which a given city may provide
goods and services.
As a rule, the gains from municipalization will be greater in
communities that are relatively more homogeneous with respect to
taste and effective demand,258 because the implicit cross-subsidies
will be less. The presence of cross-subsidies substantially compli-
cates what is achievable through public provision. Those subsi-
dizing will seek to exit or will seek to substitute private services for
public services. Moreover, if tastes, levels of demand, and ability to
pay are all more or less constant in the area, then all the citizens
will be more likely to gain from municipal provision of these goods
than if the demands are widely disparate. One city may provide
superior schools and playgrounds, another good golf courses and
ordinances against noise; yet others will provide minimal services
and low taxes. The variety of options makes everyone better off.
This suggests that there is a sound economic basis for the prolifer-
ation of municipal corporations in modern metropolitan areas,
where citizens of like tastes, interests, and income levels band to-
gether for the maximum mutual gains from public provision of
public and club goods. It also suggests that one potential problem
with the present organization of some cities is that they are too
large and heterogeneous. 59 Dissolving the municipal corporation
could solve this. With prior boundaries dissolved, the citizens of
the area would be free to consider and adopt alternative municipal
arrangements.
The gains from this approach must be balanced against a
number of competing factors. There are two nearly insupera-
ble-but illuminating-difficulties with contractual cities.
First, bankruptcy as dissolution enables parts of the city to
renege on implicit deals involving intra-municipal resource alloca-
tion. Some parts of the city will have received above-normal bene-
fits in the form of public investment, on the implicit understanding
that the city as a whole will benefit from the increased tax base.
Now, after bankruptcy, those areas will have an incentive to di-
vorce from the rest of the city, taking some of those benefits with
them.26 0 From an ex ante perspective, allowing such opportunistic
2 Of course, we are not speaking of homogeneity with respect to irrelevant or invidious
characteristics, such as race or gender.
259 See note 258.
20 Even if the benefits consist of municipal property that the new city must purchase,
they will be better off than others of their former fellow citizens, who may have no such
attractive purchase opportunities.
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behavior may inhibit cities from making efficient investments in
particular parts of town. That will depend, of course, on how cities
respond to the new bankruptcy rules. In theory, exit fees could be
specified at the beginning, so those who seek to exit know what
fees they have to pay. These might minimize the investment
problems that might otherwise arise under the new bankruptcy
rules, but they would not be easy to design or implement.26'
Second, in a voluntary reconfiguration, parcels that have a
high value relative to the costs of municipal services to them will
be able to "bid" for a low tax rate from a compliant jurisdiction.
The effect will be that few, if any, properties will be net income
producers for the city. By the same token, parcels that have high
costs of municipal services in relation to their value will be unwel-
come fellow citizens: they will be excluded from the club. In short,
this vision of municipal bankruptcy will bring an end to intra-mu-
nicipal redistribution beyond the provision of essential services by
the county.
This is surely an insuperable political objection (and may even
be problematic for efficiency reasons as well). But theoretically, it
should be possible to achieve the efficiency benefits without losing
the optimal level of redistribution. A powerful argument can be
made that redistribution, to the extent it is desirable, should be
done at the largest jurisdictional level, namely the national govern-
ment.6 2 To vest responsibility for redistribution in the cities would
lead to both distorted decisions about location and insufficiently
high levels of redistribution, since high redistribution rates will at-
tract poor people and high tax rates will repel the wealthy. The
other side of this coin, however, is that the charitable impulse
seems to be stronger with respect to neighbors than to persons who
live in distant places; that the noncharitable benefits of redistribu-
tion (esthetics, avoidance of moral or psychological discomfort, re-
duction in crime, if any) will accrue to the local level; and that
local administration could be less bureaucratic and better tailored
211 At least as applied after the fact to private individuals or businesses, exit fees are
notoriously subject to abuse, and may well be unconstitutional. See Richard A. Epstein,
Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L & Contemp Probs 147, 155-65 (1992). But see In the
Matter of the "Plan for Orderly Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Fire Insur-
ance Company, 129 NJ 389, 609 A2d 1248 (1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1066 (1993) (up-
holding insurance industry exit festrictions against a variety of constitutional attacks).
"' National redistribution would not be equivalent to national provision of local ser-
vices. There is no necessary relationship between redistribution and public provision of ser-
vices, though there may be a relationship between redistribution and public financing of
such services. For many services, vouchers would be the most efficient form of subsidy.
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to individual needs. Whatever the balance of these considerations,
the remedy of municipal dissolution followed by voluntary recon-
figuration of boundaries would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, di-
rect, local redistribution. If the purpose of cities is to create a more
efficient means of providing public and club goods, this remedy
will be superior. That it is politically impossible suggests that re-
distribution lies at the heart of the genuine purpose of the modern
city.263
Assuming, however, that contract cities could coexist with re-
distributive goals, we can focus cleanly on the efficiency issues. The
reason for introducing public ownership or control of local monop-
olies was that the monopolist would ignore the effects of excluding
some consumers from its goods. The same concerns can be raised
about our contract cities: will these cities exclude some who should
be admitted? The answer is almost certainly yes. For fixed facili-
ties with equal access to them, an existing group of citizens will
admit another consumer only if the per-citizen decrease in taxes
exceeds the per-citizen increase in congestion costs from the addi-
tional consumer. This plainly differs from the social calculation,
which asks whether the advantages to membership/citizenship for
the outsider exceed the additional congestion costs. The payment
by the outsider is just a transfer and has no efficiency effects. As
always, there is no necessary relationship between ability to pay
and benefits received from the good sought to be purchased. It is
quite plausible that the advantages from membership for the out-
sider far exceed the marginal congestion costs, yet the outsider will
lack the wherewithal to compensate the existing members for those
costs. Note that it is not the transaction costs of compensating the
preexisting citizens that drives this-the city itself is a collective
(and collecting) device-but rather it is the gap between the out-
sider's resources and benefits received.
For fixed facilities, then, we have a reason to favor mandatory
access-meaning admission to citizenship in this context--and dis-
favoring the purely volitional contract cities suggested above. The
critical question is the extent to which forcing admission will alter
the given fixed facilities themselves. We have argued that even-
handed distribution of city goods and services under a non-con-
tractual city regime results in cross-subsidization. The requirement
of contiguity-the basic definitional instrument for non-contrac-
tual cities-coupled with even-handed distribution of resources
263 As Ellickson concludes. See Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1520 (cited in note 18).
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within the city, almost surely causes one group to subsidize the
other. Individuals may be able to substitute, albeit imperfectly, be-
tween public and private services. Indeed, the rise of private police
forces and security services, is almost surely an effort by able-to-
pay taxpayers to capture more of the benefits associated with what
otherwise would have been generally available protections services,
i.e. traditional police officers. More generally, individuals forced to
share with others may find it in their private interest to drop the
level of general public services and to instead substitute private
services.
A number of empirical questions must be confronted. What
are the precise efficiency effects of subtituting private for public
services? If you install "The Club"-a popular anti-theft device for
automobiles-on your car, you divert the thief from your car to my
car. If I now hire a person to guard my car, I may redirect the
thief's attention. If we each spend enough, perhaps the thief leaves
the car theft business entirely, but it is far from obvious our pri-
vate choices are the best way to reach this goal. On the other side,
what are the gains from allowing city outsiders access to the city's
shared resources? The gains to an inner city child from access to a
wealthy suburban education might far exceed the marginal conges-
tion costs to the existing students.
These are empirical questions. The great virtue of contiguity
as a defining device is that it now costs almost nothing to imple-
ment. Our contract cities would result in large market transaction
costs. The prospect of each US citizen entering the city market,
armed with private funds and public vouchers, is daunting. The
information, negotiation, and other transaction costs might very
well dwarf any of the benefits to be obtained through allowing free
contracting. This is especially so with free movement between cit-
ies, as citizens can sort and achieve homogeneity by moving from
one jurisdiction to another. If we are right in our assessment of the
likely costs of free contracting to form cities, this suggests that ac-
cepting the existing borders of the failed city may be the right out-
come after all. This is not because the city cannot be liqui-
dated-it can-but rather that the benefits of free contracting are
likely to be few relative to the substantial costs of disturbing the
status quo.
We have pursued the notion of contract cities to see whether it
is possible to achieve greater efficiency in the provision of public
services. We have argued that the inability to exclude fellow citi-
zens from the benefits of public services may lead to underprovi-
sion of public services. Contract cities could achieve greater homo-
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geneity of taste and demand for services, and that may be
necessary to create optimal public provision. On the one hand,
greater homogeneity may result in less substitution of inefficient
private services for public services; on the other hand, more juris-
dictions means more borders-and this is especially true of our
municipal archipelagos-and borders give rise to all sorts of
externalities.
CONCLUSION
It seems elementary to say that when cities go broke it is prob-
ably a sign of fundamental trouble. But federal municipal bank-
ruptcy law is premised on the notion that all the cities need is re-
lief from their present creditors. In keeping with the extremely
limited common law remedies for municipal nonpayment of debt,
Chapter 9 leaves control in the hands of the state and the
muncipality itself. The structure for making decisions that led to
financial problems continues. The bankruptcy court lacks the pow-
ers typically given to state municipal receivers to deal with such
issues as wasteful expenditures, bloated services or contracts, inad-
equate tax systems, or inefficient boundaries. The effect is all relief
of symptoms, at best-no bitter medicine and no cure. Municipal
bankruptcy thus lacks any of the internal disciplines of private
bankruptcy. In their place, Chapter 9 imposes a series of filing re-
strictions-state authorization, insolvency, best interests of the
creditors, and good faith-so stringent that few significant munici-
palities have been able to make use of it.
We have suggested that a more powerful bankruptcy court,
grounded in state rather than federal law, would better serve the
purposes of bankruptcy and improve the lot of financially troubled
cities. More speculatively, we have suggested that the more radical
step of dissolution of the city deserves serious consideration. Disso-
lution would lead to either metropoitanization of the city govern-
ment (thus improving the tax base) or to new cities created by the
citizens. The latter idea would facilitate the provision of public
and club goods, but would create new border problems.
Even if these proposals prove unworkable, we believe that fed-
eral bankruptcy law warrants serious reexamination. In its present
form, it serves little use: it does little to address serious city
problems and, by restricting state laws directed at solving the
holdout problem, even impedes the ability of states to institute su-
perior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone broke. It is
ironic that a statute that has it roots in providing a way to solve
the holdout problem does little more than prevent the states from
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doing so themselves. In law, as in medicine, the first rule is to do
no harm. By frustrating state initiatives and providing an inacces-
sible and weak alternative, federal municipal bankruptcy law fails
that test.

